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1. Introduction 
1.1. Practical relevance 
In an increasingly competitive environment, it becomes more and more difficult to earn mon-
ey with digital content. Nevertheless, companies have to think about fee-based business mod-
els online to deal with changing environmental conditions (e.g., online newspaper providers). 
One way to earn money in a digital environment is a price introduction for content that was 
previously provided free of charge. When companies change their business model from free 
to paid content, it is generally an unexpected transition for customers; consequently, their 
willingness to pay is often low due to consumers’ “for free” mentality regarding content on 
the Internet (Sjøvaag 2015). In this regard, the manner of introducing prices as well as the 
characteristics of the business model after the price is introduced (e.g., design of a preview 
version) are essential for companies’ success.  
Practical examples show that firms in different industries struggle with changing their busi-
ness models and make their decisions about price introductions quite unsystematically. The 
New York Times (NYT), for example, struggled for a long time with introducing prices for its 
digital content, employing a mechanism also referred to as paywall. In 2005, the newspaper 
publisher started the project “time select”, requiring a fee for some parts of their website con-
tent, which came unexpectedly for most of the customers. However, two years later, it was 
announced that they would change their business model back to free content in order to in-
crease advertising revenues. In 2011, another attempt to change to a fee-based business model 
was made. In this model, customers were able to read the first 20 articles for free, but a fee 
was required to read more than 20 articles per month. The number of free articles was finally 
reduced to 10 in 2012 (Cook and Attari 2012). 
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Another example of an unsystematic price introduction comes from the software developer 
WhatsApp Inc. from California. When the small start-up company launched its smart phone 
application in February 2009, the initial idea was to create an app that would let people know 
whether the user was available for phone calls. Therefore, status messages such as “Can’t talk, 
I’m at the gym.” could be sent from one device to another for free. As consumers started us-
ing the application for instant messaging rather than status postings, the download numbers 
increased. The small company, however, was not prepared to deal with the large numbers of 
users. It was thus decided to switch the price from “free” to “US$1” in order to reduce the 
download rates. The CEOs of the company, Koum and Acton, were shocked to find that 
downloads were still increasing, despite the price introduction. Acton then acknowledged: 
“You know, I think we can actually stay paid!” (Olson 2014). 
Bank of America, one of the largest banks in the United States (Relbanks 2017), serves as an 
example of customer reactions to an unexpected price introduction. The company announced 
a monthly US$5 debit card fee in 2011 for a service which had been provided free of charge 
in the past. As a consequence of this announcement, 21,000 customers closed their checking 
account and over 300,000 customers signed an online petition to stop the price introduction. A 
few weeks later, the company reacted to consumers’ outrage and finally dropped their plans 
for introducing the new debit card fee (Mui 2011). 
These practical examples reveal that companies have a lack of experience and knowledge 
about both price introductions and customers’ reactions to new prices. The deficiency can 
lead to a loss of reputation and even negative financial consequences, as in the case of Bank 
of America. In respect to these issues, this dissertation investigates different ways of unex-
pected price introductions to provide a better understanding of customers’ reactions and to 
identify possibilities for minimizing negative consequences. 
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1.2. Definition of free-to-fee switches 
These so-called free-to-fee switches are defined as company’s decision to change its business 
model “from offering all content for free to charging for at least some of it.” (Pauwels and 
Weiss 2008, p. 14). For this dissertation, the definition by Pauwels and Weiss is adapted and 
also extended with the term “unexpected” to make sure that trial product versions and trial 
usage are excluded. The reason for this restriction is that, while users of trial products and 
services know that there will be a price in the future an important characteristic of a free-to-
fee switch is that consumers become accustomed to a certain product over a period of time 
and consider it as “free” without the awareness of future payments or restrictions. Therefore, 
the following definition is used to ensure clarity and rigor for further use of the term “free-to-
fee switch”: 
“A free-to-fee switch is an unexpected change of a business model from offer-
ing all content for free to charging for at least some of it.” (adapted from Pau-
wels and Weiss 2008). 
1.3. Reasons for free-to-fee switches 
There are different reasons as to why companies unexpectedly change their business model 
from free to fee by introducing a price for a product that had been free in the past. The most 
common reasons are classified in this chapter; however, practical examples demonstrate that, 
in many cases, the switch is based on a combination of multiple reasons, which are outlined 
below.  
Firstly, the example of the New York Times shows that companies sometimes try to explore 
new markets to expand their product portfolio (for instance, adding online content in addition 
to the traditional paper-based version of the newspaper). When the new market is very small 
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(such as the Internet was when the New York Times started its online service in 1996), it of-
ten occurs that companies underestimate the future importance of the market and begin with a 
free product to gain advertising revenues. When market conditions change – for example, the 
market grows very fast and cannibalizes demand from conventional markets – these compa-
nies might then have to introduce a price to remain profitable (Cook and Attari 2012). Anoth-
er illustration can be given by several German banks (among them the Sparkasse and Raif-
feisenbank), which in 2017, introduced a fee for withdrawing money. These companies 
switched their business model to react to a change in market conditions after the low-interest 
phase in 2016 by trying to gain revenues in an area that was for free in the past (Hübner 2016). 
A second possibility for a price introduction is an infrastructure whereby companies‘ costs 
rise with an increasing number of users, thus forcing the company to introduce a price. One 
example is the aforementioned start-up company WhatsApp Inc. (Olson 2014). Expenses for 
technical equipment and personnel costs for maintaining the functionality of its messenger 
service increased dramatically with the increasing number of users. This compelled the com-
pany to switch its business model from free to fee.  
In other cases, companies know from the beginning that they wish to introduce a price in the 
future but, initially, launch the service or product for free. This business strategy is common 
among companies with products or services based on network effects, which means that the 
usefulness of the service or product increases as the number of users increases – social net-
works are a good example of this strategy (Cheng and Tang 2010). The business-oriented 
social network LinkedIn, for instance, achieved its value thanks to its 500 million members 
connecting to each other (Strauss 2017). Online networks such as LinkedIn grow faster when 
they are free (Chaffey 2017) but may consider price introductions in the future when the bar-
riers for changing the provider are higher; for example because customers have already estab-
lished their contacts. 
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Another reason for companies to switch from free to fee exists in external usage regulations. 
As one case in point, the government of the United Kingdom regulated the usage of plastic 
bags in 2015 by passing a law that included a minimum charge of five pence for plastic bags 
for retailers with 250 or more full-time employees (Smithers 2016). To avoid fines, supermar-
kets had to introduce a price for plastic bags, now charging their customers for the use of a 
previously complimentary product. An alternate example is expiring funding for cultural insti-
tutions, such as museums or exhibitions, or educational programs. In many cases, these pro-
jects are funded by a third party (e.g., the government) for a certain time period. When this 
funding expires, companies are forced to introduce a price to cover their future expenses (Ro-
sa and Elbert 2011). 
1.4. From free to freemium 
Freemium is a business model in which companies (e.g., online newspaper providers) offer a 
free functional restricted product version (e.g., ten free articles per month) and a fee-based 
product without restrictions (e.g., a yearly subscription rate for full access) at the same time 
(Kumar 2014). A special exception to the free-to-fee switch is created when companies switch 
their business model from free to freemium. In a freemium business model, the free version 
serves as a powerful marketing tool. In particular, smaller start-up companies may use the free 
version to increase customer awareness (Arora et al. 2017) that less advertisement is needed. 
A freemium model can also be a promising way to establish or strengthen customer relation-
ships by staying in contact with users who do not want to buy the product immediately. 
Moreover, the free version could deter customers from switching to competitive products 
from other providers, as they have already put effort and time into learning and adapting to 
the current product or service (Hung-Pin 2012). A good illustration of this can be seen in the 
practices of the software company Adobe Systems Inc., which provides the free PDF reader to 
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accustom customers to the data format, which then enables them to sell the PDF writer in 
return (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005).  
1.5. Previews and freemium business models 
The free version in a freemium business model is often used as a preview for fee-based con-
tent. Previews, or trailers, are subsequently characterized as a form of marketing advertising 
using “free samples to aid in […] decision making” (Kernan 2004, p. 1). Especially in the 
context of online journalism or movies, preview versions are essential to increase consumers’ 
curiosity and provide information about paid content (e.g., quality, story, or interest in the 
genre) (Kernan 2004). Cheng and Tang (2010) have shown that it is crucial to consider the 
characteristics of free content in a freemium business model to minimize the cannibalization 
effects on the commercial offer, while still providing a useful free version that could serve as 
a teaser for paid content. Previous research reveals that the characteristics of the free-version 
(e.g., quantity of the content) have an impact on consumers’ buying decisions (e.g., Cheng 
and Tang 2010; Haruvy and Prasad 2001). Thus, in the context of price introductions, the 
design of the free preview version is important for a company’s success when switching from 
free to fee. 
1.6. Literature review of free-to-fee switches and preview characteristics 
Within the scholarly literature, research articles about free-to-fee switches exist in different 
fields, ranging from journalism to education to marketing. However, investigations about 
preview characteristics are very rare. This chapter discusses the relevant literature, starting 
with the history of free-to-fee switches in online journalism, determinants of willingness to 
pay (WTP) after a free-to-fee switch, as well as consequences and customer reactions to free-
to-fee switches. Following from this, the chapter presents a discussion on research articles that 
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deal with the success of the business model change, different switching strategies, and pre-
view characteristics. 
A brief history of the evolution of free-to-fee switches in online journalism, also known as 
paywalls, is provided by Arrese (2015), who described different periods from the first pio-
neers to the far-reaching paywalls of the big online newspaper websites. Additionally, the 
adaptation process for these paywalls was found to follow the same rules as the diffusion of 
an innovation (Arrese 2015). The author also mentioned that most companies use a freemium 
model with a free preview version and a commercial full-version after introducing the paywall.  
Kammer et al. (2015) identified different factors that influence customers’ willingness to pay 
after a free-to-fee switch (e.g., attitude toward paying for online news, journalistic quality, 
and subscription models). Moreover, the authors found that willingness to pay after a free-to-
fee switch increased for younger customers when they are able to combine content from dif-
ferent providers. The research by Hsiang (2005) showed that time spent on reading newspa-
pers is positively correlated with customers’ willingness to pay for online newspaper websites 
while format preferences and income have no influence. Cook and Attari (2012) took a more 
detailed look at the case of the New York Times paywall and found that a compelling justifi-
cation is necessary to emphasize fairness perception during and after the switch. Framing the 
justification after the free-to-fee switch in terms of financial necessity leads to greater will-
ingness to pay compared to a profit-oriented framing. In the context of online music, Ziyou 
and Yan (2014) found that cognitive lock-in effects – customers’ decreased switching inten-
tion after an initial investment (Zauberman 2003) – influences customers’ intentions to switch 
from free to fee. Customers are more likely to switch from free to fee when lock-in effects are 
high (Ziyou and Yan 2014); for example, when they are familiar with a specific interface or a 
unique data format that is not compatible with other competing programs. The authors rec-
ommended offering content at multiple levels of services and at different quality levels as 
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well as promoting perceived benefits of the commercial product to create the desired lock-in 
effects. However, Sjøvaag (2015) argued that not every type of content is appropriate for a 
price introduction because free alternatives are obtainable in many areas, allowing customers 
to switch to another provider. Therefore, it could be easier for niche publications without a 
competitive environment, such as local news, to introduce a paywall. 
Likewise in the literature, the consequences of free-to-fee switches are also investigated in 
different areas. Cook and Attari (2012) showed that most of the customers did not pay after 
the introduction of the New York Times paywall in 2005. Instead, they rated the newspaper as 
less valuable, visited the website less frequently, and used loopholes to get free access to paid 
content. Moreover, Oh et al. (2015) showed that the New York Times paywall introduction 
also decreases online word-of-mouth effectiveness. In a similar vein, Chiou and Tucker 
(2013) argued that the switch to a subscription model excludes young readers because of their 
reduced willingness to pay – with negative consequences for policymakers trying to create a 
comprehensive community. The discussion by Yamada (2015) in the context of Chinese uni-
versities also revealed that the shift from free to fee for educational programs discourages the 
inclusion of poorer students because their families cannot afford the introduced price.  
Additionally, two articles deal with consequences and customers reactions to free-to-fee 
switches in a marketing context. First, Pauwels and Weiss (2008) have investigated long-term 
revenue losses after a free-to-fee switch of an online newspaper provider. In this study, the 
authors compared different subscription systems after the switch, showing that a monthly 
subscription is superior compared to a yearly subscription system. Moreover, they compared 
different marketing activities (i.e., e-mail and search-engine referrals) and their effect on gen-
erating monthly and yearly subscriptions. The findings indicated that e-mail and search engine 
promotions are more effective in generating new yearly subscriptions, while price promotions 
lead to higher monthly subscriptions. Second, the investigation by Tuzovic et al. (2014) fo-
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cused on free-to-fee switches in the context of airline ancillary fees; this refers to the different 
components of an airline service that were previously free, which are now charged (e.g., addi-
tional baggage fees). Their results showed that customers’ negative reactions to free-to-fee 
switches are characterized by feelings of betrayal and anger; although, the intensity of cus-
tomers’ emotional reactions differs across different types of ancillary fees.  
Some research articles questioned the success of switching the business model from free to 
fee in general. Myllylahti (2014) argued that, due to higher consumer reactance, paywalls 
generate only 10% of publishers’ revenues, which is not substantial enough to become a via-
ble business model. The author stated that this finding can differ across different countries 
with different preferences. Reid (2002a) has also demonstrated that the reactance to newspa-
per paywalls is high. Nonetheless, online newspaper providers have to decide whether to in-
troduce a price or to work with an advertisement-based business model, which could also lead 
to customer hesitance (Reid 2002b). According to Boumans (2005), the low willingness to 
pay after a free-to-fee switch is only a temporary issue on the Internet. Boumans (2005) has 
argued that paid content is still growing and should be viewed as undergoing a catching-up 
phase. 
Different ways of switching from free to fee and the implementation of prices are discussed in 
the research articles of Rosa and Elbert (2011), Latimer (1996), and Witell and Löfgren 
(2013). The switching strategy of the educational program described by Rosa and Elbert 
(2011) provides some insights into aspects of making a successful free-to-fee switch. The 
authors found that the recommendation of experts and professionals after the switch is one 
important factor. Findings also demonstrated that it is necessary to communicate the quality 
of the service, to develop the ability to “sell”, and to make a detailed analysis of the target 
group to find an appropriate price (system). Additionally, Latimer (1996) recommended that 
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the introduction of fees should be used to reinvest in better service quality, equipment, and 
salaries. 
The research article by Witell and Löfgren (2013) further identified eight strategies (based on 
case studies) to accomplish a free-to-fee switch in the context of services for manufacturing 
companies, namely:  
1. Introducing a new price without any product or service changes 
“Yesterday it was free – today it has a price!”;  
2. Offering a completely new fee-based service 
“New service – new rules”; 
3. Communicating the service value to justify the switch 
“The value of service”;  
4. Introducing a new fee-based service in addition to a free product 
“We deliver a product AND a service”;  
5. Introducing an extended fee-based service with higher quality or better features than the 
basic service 
“We deliver a basic service AND extended services”; 
6. Communicating a price-quality relationship to justify the switch 
“You get what you pay for”;  
7. Justifying the price introduction with a new partner who makes the price introduction 
necessary 
“Our new Partner cannot work for free”;  
8. Providing more value when introducing the new price 
“We give you disproportional value”. 
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Some of the switching strategies include the option of offering a free reduced version and a 
fee-based version at the same time (freemium) (Kumar 2014). In some industries the free ver-
sion is used as a teaser or preview for paid content (e.g., previews for online news articles, or 
trailers for movies). In this regard, the characteristics of the preview version should affect 
customers’ perception of the freemium business model and therefore also the success of the 
free-to-fee switch. However, research articles in the area of different preview characteristics 
are currently lacking.  
One exception to this is the study by Finsterwalder et al. (2012), who have investigated cus-
tomers’ expectations based on different movie trailers. The research results show that con-
sumers’ genre preference influences the evaluation of movie trailers. In addition, the reputa-
tion of the actors and the director mentioned in the trailer, the music, as well as information 
about the storyline all have a strong impact on customers’ expectations of the movie. Hixson 
(2006) also investigated the effectiveness of different segmentation types to target movie 
trailers and similarly identifies consumers’ genre preference to be a strong predictor for per-
ceived entertainment value of the movie after watching the trailer. To add to these analyses, 
Kernan (2004) discussed different ways of using rhetoric elements in movie trailers. In partic-
ular, the author identified three preview characteristics that have a strong impact on customers’ 
willingness to pay for a movie; namely, communication of the genre, storyline, and actors. 
Besides research about free-to-fee switches, academic articles have also covered free or fee-
based business models (e.g., Froimovici et al. 2013; Fruchter et al. 2011; Klein et al. 2016; 
Mahmood et al. 2005), willingness to pay for online content without being directly related to 
fee-to-fee switches (e.g., Goyanes 2014; Punj 2015; Vock et al. 2013; Ye et al. 2004), ac-
ceptance for commercial content (e.g., Choi et al. 2015), price effects of free products (zero 
price effects) (e.g., Baumbach 2016; Hossain and Saini 2015) and freemium business models 
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(e.g., Kumar 2014; Martin 2012). These areas cover effects before or after the switch but are 
not directly related to the switch itself.  
Alongside the area of preview characteristics, some investigations have also explored the ef-
fects of movies, video games, or comic characteristics (e.g., interrupted endings) (Colbus 
2013; Lambert 2009), but they do not refer to the context of previews. Other research articles 
have examined the effect of different characteristics of free versions in freemium business 
models (products with reduced functionality), which are likewise not considered to be pre-
views (e.g., Cheng and Tang 2010; Haruvy and Prasad 2001). Table 1 shows an overview of 
the relevant academic literature about free-to-fee switches and preview characteristics. 
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Focus Context Author(s) Method Main Findings 
Free to Fee – 
History  
Online 
journalism 
Arrese (2016) 
Conceptual 
paper 
» Four stages in the evolution of paywall adoption are identified: experimenters, 
pioneers (1994 - 2000), the frenzy of failed trials (2001 - 2007) and Murdoch’s 
crusade (2008 - 2010). 
» The history of paywalls shows how some brands have made an important con-
tribution to the growing popularity of new payment systems in the media in-
dustry. 
» The free vs. paid dilemma has been overcome by market circumstances and by 
readers' behavior. 
» The majority of online newspapers tend to work with a freemium business 
model. 
Free to Fee – 
Determinants 
of WTP 
Online 
journalism 
Kammer et al. 
(2015) 
Empirical 
survey 
research 
and focus 
groups 
» Individuals’ willingness to pay after a free-to-fee switch is influenced by their 
attitude toward paying for online news, journalistic quality, and the subscrip-
tion models. 
» Younger consumers’ willingness to pay increases if they can combine content 
from different news providers and thereby individualize their news products. 
» Most consumers do not want to pay for news at all, neither online nor offline. 
Free to Fee – 
Determinants 
of WTP 
Online 
journalism 
Hsiang (2005) 
Empirical 
survey 
research 
» Higher WTP was associated with more time spent on reading newspapers. 
However, income or format preferences were not associated with higher WTP. 
» Most Internet users in Hong Kong were not paying for online news services 
and did not show a strong intent to pay in the future. 
» Hong Kong’s Internet users think that the subscription model is not working 
and may not work well in the future. 
Table 1: Literature review 
 14 
 
Focus Context Author(s) Method Main Findings 
Free to Fee – 
Determinants 
of WTP/ 
Consequences 
of free-to-fee 
switches 
Online 
journalism 
Cook and 
Attari (2012) 
Empirical 
survey 
research 
» Framing the paywall in terms of financial necessity moderately increased sup-
port and willingness to pay. Framing the paywall in terms of a profit motive 
sharply decreased both support and willingness to pay. 
» Most readers did not pay after the introduction of the NYT paywall.  
The newspaper was rated as less valuable after the free-to-fee switch. Moreo-
ver, consumers visited the website less frequently, and used loopholes, par-
ticularly those who thought the paywall would lead to inequality. 
Free to Fee – 
Determinants 
of WTP 
Online 
music 
Ziyou and Yan 
(2014) 
Empirical 
survey 
research  
» To encourage consumer intention to pay, online content providers could offer 
content at multiple levels-of-service with different quality levels for paid con-
tent. 
» Content providers could also promote consumer intention to pay through 
changing their perceived sacrifices and perceived benefits with a good com-
munication policy. 
Free to Fee – 
Determinants 
of WTP 
Online 
journalism 
Sjøvaag (2015) Case study 
» The "for free” culture on the Internet makes it challenging for customers to 
pay for something that was for free in the past. 
» Not all types of online content are suitable for introducing a paywall. 
In most parts of the online news landscape, free alternatives are likely (e.g., 
politics or sports), which makes it difficult to introduce a paywall. 
» The success of paywalls is more likely in niche publications, such as local 
news. 
Free to Fee – 
Consequences 
of free-to-fee 
switches 
Online 
journalism 
Oh et al. 
(2015) 
Empirical 
field data 
» The introduction of a paywall has a negative impact on online word-of-mouth 
effectiveness (e.g., the volume of word-of-mouth for NYT’s content dropped 
significantly after the paywall has been introduced). 
Table 1 (continued): Literature review 
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Focus Context Author(s) Method Main Findings 
Free to Fee – 
Consequences 
of free-to-fee 
switches 
Online 
journalism 
Chiou and 
Tucker (2013) 
Empirical 
field data 
» The introduction of paywalls leads to a large decline in readership, particularly 
among young readers. 
Free to Fee – 
Consequences 
of free-to-fee 
switches 
Education 
Yamada 
(2015) 
Conceptual 
paper 
» Fee-based reforms for educational programs discourage the inclusion of poor-
er students. 
» Elite universities in China benefit from government investment in higher edu-
cation while regions of weaker economic power have to place the burden of 
fees on the students. 
Free to Fee – 
Consequences 
of free-to-fee 
switches 
Online 
journalism 
Pauwels and 
Weiss (2008) 
Empirical 
field data 
» The switch to a freemium model slows down the increase of free users and ef-
fectiveness of marketing communications. 
» Weekly subscriptions are superior compared to yearly subscription with re-
gards to revenue losses. 
» E-mail and search engine promotions are more effective in generating yearly 
subscriptions; price promotion is more effective in generating monthly sub-
scription. 
Free to Fee – 
Customers 
reactions to 
free-to-fee 
switches 
Airline 
ancillary 
fees 
Tuzovic et al. 
(2014) 
Empirical 
survey 
research 
» Companies have to communicate values in return for newly introduced fees to 
avoid negative consequences. 
» Customers’ negative consequences (e.g., complaining, negative word of 
mouth, fee avoidance) vary across different price components for which a 
price was introduced (e.g., baggage fee, entertainment fee, etc.). 
» The negative effects of free-to-fee switches are explained by the recognition of 
feelings of betrayal and anger. 
Table 1 (continued): Literature review 
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Focus Context Author(s) Method Main Findings 
Free to Fee – 
Questioning 
the business 
model switch 
Online 
journalism 
Myllylahti 
(2014) 
Case study 
» Newspaper paywalls provide only ten percent of media companies’ publishing 
revenues. 
» The revenue generated by paid online news content is not substantial enough 
to make paywalls a viable business model. 
» Prices in some cases are decreasing and paywalls are softening because com-
panies fight for new subscribers. 
Free to Fee – 
Questioning 
the business 
model switch 
Online 
journalism 
Reid (2002a, 
2002b) 
Conceptual 
paper 
» Online publishers must make a decision whether to switch from free to fee or 
work with advertiser-initiated spyware. 
» Freemium models are a good option for online publishers. 
Free to Fee – 
Questioning 
the business 
model switch 
Online 
services 
Boumans 
(2005) 
Conceptual 
paper 
» Reactance against paid content is only a temporary issue on the Internet be-
cause users get used to a legal way of getting their online content. 
» Paid content is still growing ahead of economic indicators; this can be seen as 
a catching-up phase. 
Free to Fee – 
Switching 
strategies 
Education 
Rosa and 
Elbert (2011) 
Case study 
» A plan for educational programs has to be developed for sustainability after 
external funding expires. 
» One way for sustainability is based on a transition to a fee-based service (e.g., 
service fees). 
Free to Fee – 
Switching 
strategies 
Online 
journalism 
Latimer (1996) Case study 
» The transition from free to fee provides companies with the chance to improve 
the service because of extra income. 
» The amount of extra income should be used for new equipment or better sala-
ries. 
Table 1 (continued): Literature review 
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Focus Context Author(s) Method Main Findings 
Free to Fee – 
Switching 
strategies 
Innovation  
Witell and 
Löfgren (2013) 
Case study 
» Different strategies to accomplish a free-to-fee switch are identified. 
The strategies are categorized in a change in the business model, incremental 
business model innovation or radical business model innovation. 
» The authors also suggest changing the content as well as the structure to per-
form a radical business model innovation. 
Preview 
characteristics  
Movie 
trailers 
Finsterwalder 
et al. (2012) 
Qualitative 
interviews 
» Genre preferences strongly influence the evaluation of a movie trailer. 
» The reputation of the actors and director mentioned in the trailer have a strong 
positive impact on expectations of the quality of the movie. 
» The trailer music as well as appropriate information about the storyline of the 
movie positively affects consumer expectations. 
Preview 
characteristics  
 
Movie 
trailers 
Hixson (2006) 
Empirical 
survey 
research 
» Genre preference is a strong predictor for entertainment value of the movie 
after watching a movie trailer. 
» Consumers with similar preferences and perceptions of the movie trailer have 
similar behaviors, making genre preference segmentation and behavior seg-
mentation possible. 
Preview 
characteristics  
Movie 
trailers 
Kernan (2004) 
Case study 
and 
conceptual 
» The three movie trailer features: genres, stories, and/or stars have been identi-
fied as central for the success of a movie. 
Table 1 (continued): Literature review 
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While the relevant literature has focused on determinants of willingness to pay after a free-to-fee 
switch (e.g., Kammer et al. 2015) or consequences of price introductions (e.g., Oh et al. 2015, 
Pauwels and Weiss 2008), there is still a gap in fundamental knowledge about consumers’ psy-
chological reactions to free-to-fee switches (Tuzovic et al. 2014). While price increases have 
been investigated over the last fifteen years (e.g., Campbell 1999a; Xia et al. 2004) research 
about price introductions and the effects of different forms of free-to-fee switches are still rare. 
Additionally, current literature has not focused on the unexpected aspect of price introductions. 
Moreover, only a few investigations, such as Kernan’s study (2004), shed light on the effects of 
different preview characteristics. While free-to-fee switches have a high relevance in the context 
of online content (e.g., online news providers), the effects of different preview characteristics 
after the introduction of a freemium business model are important for the success of a free-to-fee 
switch. However, none of the identified research articles covered the effect of text-based preview 
characteristics on customers’ purchase decision. This is surprising, considering the high rele-
vance for online newspaper providers. 
Additionally, only two of the identified research articles used established theories or a theoretical 
framework. The first articles, by Ziyou and Yan (2014), used the status quo bias theory (the sta-
tus quo makes consumers accustomed to free content) to infer assumptions about customers’ 
reactance against free-to-fee switches. The second article by Tuzovic et al. (2014) used the price 
fairness theory (unfairness involves a violation of certain norms resulting in affective responses) 
to explore customers’ negative emotional reactions to free-to-fee switches. However, these are 
exceptions: the majority of research articles were based on practical experiences, or exploratory 
research approaches. Therefore, a theoretical framework as well as a solid theoretical foundation 
for assumptions about free-to-fee switches appear to be necessary.  
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Practical examples and the relevant scholarly literature show that fundamental and theory-based 
knowledge about different forms of free-to-fee switches and knowledge about preview character-
istics after the switch are underrepresented. Despite the growing interest of companies in differ-
ent areas (e.g., software developers, newspaper providers, etc.), there are only a few academic 
articles about consumer reactions to free-to-fee switches. Additionally, different ways of accom-
plishing the switch from free to fee have, thus far, not been adequately investigated. Therefore, 
the purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the scholarly literature and provide much-
needed insights for companies confronted with free-to-fee switches. 
1.7. Content of the dissertation 
In order to attain this purpose, this dissertation covers (1) the fundamental mechanisms of unex-
pected free-to-fee switches, (2) different forms of free-to-fee switches, and (3) previews for 
online newspaper providers that were affected by free-to-fee switches. This dissertation thus 
consists of three individual papers (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Overview of the three individual papers and their purposes 
The first paper sheds light on customers’ reactions to free-to-fee switches, including the underly-
ing psychological mechanisms. Two empirical studies compare a free-to-fee switch with a con-
Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3
“The Mechanisms of 
Free-to-Fee Switches –
A Special Form of a 
Price Increase?”
“Free no More -
The Effects of Choice Options in 
Unexpected Free-to-Fee 
Switches”
“To Be Continued… The Effects 
of Interrupted Preview Endings 
on Purchase Decisions”
Purpose: Uncover the basic 
mechanisms of free-to-fee 
switches by comparing it with a 
conventional price increase.
Purpose: Comparison of different 
types of free-to-fee switches and 
other ways to minimize negative 
consequences.
Purpose: Gain knowledge about 
different preview endings for 
online newspaper providers 
affected by a free-to-fee switch.
 20 
 
ventional price increase to ascertain the characteristics of unexpected price introductions. These 
investigations further demonstrate the different ways of reducing customers’ negative reactions 
by providing a justification for the switch and announcing extra product value while introducing 
the price. Figure 2 sums up the empirical examinations of Paper 1. 
 
Figure 2: Summary of Paper 1 
Companies have different possibilities when switching from free to fee. One possibility is a 
forced switch without the opportunity to use parts of the product for free after the switch. Anoth-
er option is the freemium model, which allows customers to continue using a functionally re-
stricted product version for free (Kumar 2014). The second paper compares these two switching 
options and considers different feature reduction levels of the free-version in the freemium 
switching option as well as the effect of providing a justification for the switch. Paper 2 consists 
of four empirical studies, shown in Figure 3. 
Effects of Free-to-Fee-Switches:
Study 1: 
Identification of customers’ reactions to free-to-fee switches and possibilities of 
minimizing negative consequences
Method: Qualitative in-depth interviews 
Sample: N = 18, Mage = 44.0, 53.0% female, mean duration 40 minutes, snowball 
sample
Study 2: 
Quantitative validation of the results of Study 1 based on a field experiment
Method: Field experiment, between-subject: 2 (price change: free-to-fee vs. price 
increase) x 2 (price change magnitude: low vs. moderate) x 2 (justification: 
no vs. yes) x 2 (extra value: no vs. yes), fractional factorial design
Sample: N = 378, Mage = 21.0, 50.5% female, student sample
Paper 1
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Figure 3: Summary of Paper 2 
Many companies choose a freemium business model after a free-to-fee switch (e.g., online 
newspaper providers) in the form of a free-preview version (e.g., short teaser articles) alongside 
the fee-based full-version (e.g., subscription to access the full content). However, uncertainty 
still remains concerning how to design preview versions after a free-to-fee switch. Therefore, the 
third paper focuses on different forms of preview ending types (interrupted vs. concluded end-
ing) for text-based previews in four experimental investigations. Figure 4 displays an overview 
of the variety of different studies conducted for Paper 3. 
Effects of Choice in Free-to-Fee-Switches:
Study 1: 
Main effect of free-to-fee switches and the different switching options
Method: Scenario-based online experiment, repeated measurement (within-subject): 2 
(point in time: before vs. after the switch) x 2 (switching option: forced vs. 
freemium), using a utilitarian product
Sample: N = 65, Mage = 22.9, 43.1% female, student sample
Study 2: 
Validating the effect of different switching options
Method: Scenario-based online experiment, between-subject: 2 (switching option: 
forced vs. freemium) x 2 (product type: utilitarian product vs. hedonic 
product)
Sample: N = 187, Mage = 44.0, 51.3% female, recruited by a market research company
Study 3: 
Effect of different levels of feature 
reduction in the freemium switching 
options
Method: Scenario-based online 
experiment, between-subject: 3 
(feature reduction of the free-
product in the freemium switch: 
low vs. medium vs. high) + 
forced switch as control group 
Sample: N = 394, Mage = 21.4, 45.7% 
female, student sample
Enhancing Fairness in Free-to-Fee-Switches:
Study 4: 
Main effects of providing a justification
Method: Scenario-based online 
experiment, between-subject: 
2 (justification: no vs. yes) x 
2 (switching option: forced 
vs. freemium)
Sample: N = 189, Mage = 32.6, 39.2% 
female, MTurk sample
Justification Effects:Feature Reduction Effects:
Paper 2
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Figure 4: Summary of Paper 3 
Consequently, this dissertation focuses on three main questions:  
1. What are the fundamental mechanisms of free-to-fee switches compared to conventional 
price increases? 
2. What are differences between the two main free-to-fee switching options (forced vs. free-
mium switch)? 
3. How can companies increase revenues after a free-to-fee switch by considering different 
preview characteristics? 
Effects of Interrupted Preview Endings:
Study 1: 
Effect of interrupted preview endings on arousal
Method: Galvanic skin response experiment, between-subject: preview type 
(interrupted vs. concluded preview ending) 
Sample: N = 51, Mage = 25.0, 58.8% female, student sample
Study 2: 
Effect of interrupted preview endings on purchases
Method: Incentive-aligned experiment, between-subject: preview type (C) 
Sample: N = 120, Mage = 20.8 years, 50.8% female, student sample
Study 3: 
Validating the effects of Study 1 and 2 in an overall model while including feeling of 
betrayal as a mediator and individual need for closure as a moderator
Method: Scenario-based online experiment, between-subject: preview type (interrupted 
vs. concluded preview ending)
Sample: N = 125, Mage = 21.0 years, 56.8% female, student sample
Study 4: 
Including closure hindrance as another moderator in the overall model
Method: Scenario-based online experiment, between-subject: 2 (preview type: 
interrupted vs. concluded preview ending)  2 (closure hindrance: yes vs. no).
Sample: N = 132, Mage = 20.65 years, 55.3% female, student sample
Paper 3
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In sum, the purpose of this dissertation is to fill the gap in the scholarly literature about price 
introductions by providing a better understanding of customers’ reactions and ways of minimiz-
ing their negative consequences and by showing how to use different preview characteristics 
after a free-to-fee switch. Empirical approaches are thus employed with a variety of different 
samples. Eighteen qualitative interviews were conducted, 368 students participated in a field 
experiment and 1263 consumers took part in online survey-based experiments, resulting in a sum 
of 1649 participants for the empirical examinations, as can be seen in Table 2.  
  Method Sample origin N 
Paper 1 
“Switching From Free to 
Fee: More Than Just a 
Price Increase?” 
Study 1 Qualitative in-depth interviews Snowball sample 18 
Study 2 
Field experiment 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
Undergraduate 
students 
378 
Paper 2 
“Free no More - 
The Effects of Choice 
Options in Unexpected 
Free-to-Fee Switches” 
Study 1 
Online survey 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
Undergraduate 
students 
65 
Study 2 
Online survey 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
Professional market 
research company 
187 
Study 3 
Online survey 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
Undergraduate 
students 
394 
Study 4 
Online survey 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
MTurk 
sample 
189 
Paper 3 
“To Be Continued… 
Effects of Interrupted 
Previews on Emotional 
Responses and Purchase 
Decisions” 
Study 1 
Galvanic skin response 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
Undergraduate 
students 
51 
Study 2 
Incentive-aligned 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
Undergraduate 
students 
120 
Study 3 
Online survey 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
Undergraduate 
students 
125 
Study 4 
Online survey 
(Scenario-based experiment) 
 
Undergraduate 
students 
132 
    Ʃ = 1649 
Table 2: Method and sample summary 
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2. Paper 1: Switching From Free to Fee - More Than Just a Price In-
crease? 
2.1. Abstract  
This research investigates customers’ reactions to free-to-fee switches (i.e., price introductions 
for products or services that were previously available for free). Specifically, it compares a free-
to-fee switch to a conventional price increase, where the initial price was not zero. Building upon 
cognitive appraisal theory and drawing from 18 qualitative in-depth interviews, a conceptual 
model is developed and tested in a field experiment. Findings demonstrate that compared to price 
increases at different levels, a free-to-fee switch leads to higher perceived betrayal and anger, 
and, subsequently, fewer actual purchases. Moreover, two moderators are identified: providing a 
justification for the price change and offering extra value of the product after the change. While 
both reduce the feeling of perceived betrayal and anger, and lead to more purchases, they also 
interact with the type of pricing decision, such that the effects of both justification and extra val-
ue on purchases are stronger for a free-to-fee switch (vs. a price increase). Overall, the findings 
provide insights into the mechanisms of customers’ response to free-to-fee switches as well as 
how they differ from conventional price increases. 
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Additional note:  
 Parts of this paper were presented at the Academy of Marketing Science (AMS) Annual 
Conference, San Diego, May 2017. 
The conference submission received the Stanley C. Hollander Best Retailing Paper 
Award of the Academy of Marketing Science (AMS) Annual Conference, San Diego, 
May 2017. 
 
 A prior version of this paper is coauthored with JProf. Dr. Tobias Schäfers (TU 
Dortmund University) and Monika Kukar-Kinney (University of Richmond):  
Cziehso, G. P., Schaefers, T., Kukar-Kinney, M.: „Switching From Free to Fee - More 
Than Just a Price Increase?”. 
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2.2. Introduction 
 
“Even though I can, obviously, pay a buck a year, somehow I think this move is 
not cool. Probably because of the change.” (Reader’s response on 
www.appleinsider.com to Whatsapp’s introduction of a yearly usage fee in 2012) 
 
Academic research and anecdotal evidence consistently find price increases to elicit negative 
customers’ reactions, such as complaints about a US$1 increase in the monthly fee for the video-
streaming service Netflix (Gottfried 2015) or the 25% price increase of Amazon Prime (Streit-
feld 2014). Previous research provides insights into the psychological process of customers’ re-
actions to price increases, the negative consequences, and ways to minimize these undesirable 
effects (e.g., Campbell 1999a; Homburg et al. 2005; Urbany et al. 1989; Xia et al. 2004). How-
ever, aside from conventional price increases, companies increasingly use so-called free-to-fee 
switches by initially introducing products or services for free and, only after the product has been 
adopted within the target group, introducing a price for it (Pauwels and Weiss 2008). Although 
similar to a price increase, free-to-fee switches appear to elicit stronger negative reactions among 
customers. For example, the New York Times terminated its initial introduction of an annual fee 
for their online content in 2005 (TimeSelect) and returned to its free business model after experi-
encing a large customer revolt (Macmillan 2007). Bank of America’s announcement of a new 
monthly US$5 debit card fee in 2011 also resulted in massive customer outrage and led the com-
pany to drop their plans for its introduction (Mui 2011).  
A broad range of extant research has studied customer responses to price increases (e.g., Bolton 
et al. 2003; Frey and Pommerehne 1993; Kahneman et al. 1986; Martin et al. 2009; Schein 2002; 
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Urbany et al. 1989). Findings indicate that increased prices typically trigger negative emotional 
responses, such as perceptions of unfairness or feelings of anger (Peine et al. 2008; Rotemberg 
2005; Xia et al. 2004). Customers’ reactions to price increases are primarily driven by the magni-
tude of the price increase and the perceived fairness of the motive underlying the price change 
(Homburg et al. 2005). Negative reactions to price increases can be reduced by providing a ra-
tionale for the price change (Kachelmeier et al. 1991; Martin et al. 2009; Schein 2002). The 
reputation and an assumed positive motive of the company reduce negative customers’ responses 
(Campbell 1999a; Campbell 1999b). While the effects of price increases are well-known, to the 
best of our knowledge, only two empirical studies have focused on free-to-fee switches in a mar-
keting context. The first study by Pauwels and Weiss (2008) studied long-term revenue losses 
associated with a free-to-fee switch by comparing different subscription systems for online 
newspapers. Their investigation shows that a monthly subscription is superior compared to a 
yearly subscription. Referrals from e-mail and search-engines appear to be more effective at in-
creasing yearly subscription rate. The second study, by Tuzovic et al. (2014), examined accepta-
bility of airline ancillary fees for services that had previously been for free. Based on their inves-
tigation, customers’ negative reactions to free-to-fee switches (e.g., feeling betrayed and angry) 
differ across different types of ancillary fees. At the same time, free-to-fee switches have been 
described across other disciplines, including medical services (e.g., price introductions for medi-
cal check-ups: Froimovici et al. 2013), arts and culture (e.g., educational programs with expiring 
external funding introducing a fee: Rosa and Elbert 2011), or journalism (e.g., introducing “pay-
walls” for online newspapers: Arrese 2015; Kammer et al. 2015). However, research on issues 
fundamental to understanding and implementing free-to-fee switches – such as customers’ reac-
tions to the switch itself and how they differ from their reactions to conventional price increases 
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– is sparse. This is surprising, as Shampanier et al. (2007) show that “zero is a unique number, 
reward, price, and probability” (p. 754), which should also lead to different customers’ reactions 
to price changes for the initially free products. Given the lack of knowledge on this topic, we 
seek to develop an understanding of how customers react to price introductions in the form of 
free-to-fee switches, as well as whether and how this reaction differs from a reaction to a con-
ventional price increase. Moreover, a further objective of this research is to identify factors that 
may attenuate the negative consequences of the switch. Overall, thus we contribute to the exist-
ing literature by first identifying the theoretical mechanism underlying customer responses to 
free-to-fee switches (versus price increases) and secondly uncovering two ways in which nega-
tive consequences can be minimized.  
Using a mixed-methods approach that combines qualitative and field experiment data, we pro-
vide managerial recommendations with regards to determining an appropriate pricing strategy 
for new products or services as well as to successfully implementing free-to-fee switches. Thus, 
this investigation is of practical importance for businesses dealing with a switch in their pricing 
strategy from free to fee (e.g., app developers, online journalism, or banks).  
2.3. Study 1  
2.3.1. Method and data 
In order to better understand customers’ reactions to free-to-fee switches, in-depth interviews 
were conducted with 18 participants (Mage = 31.4 years, 53% female, Mduration = 40 minutes; see 
Appendix A for details on informants). Participants were recruited by snowball sampling (Noy 
2008) starting with graduate students. The interviews focused on gathering customers’ general 
perceptions of price introductions. Specifically, we assessed (1) participants’ expectations of free 
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and fee-based products, (2) their reactions to free-to-fee switches compared to conventional price 
increases, and (3) their opinion as to how negative reactions could be minimized. During each 
interview, we also asked the participants to imagine a free-to-fee switch for a product that they 
currently use for free (e.g., smart phone app), to gain insights into their immediate emotional 
reactions to a potential switch. Subsequently, we conducted a hermeneutic, iterative analysis 
(Spiggle 1994) of the interview data. We performed a cross-case analysis among informants in 
which we followed a grounded-theory approach in order to identify emerging codes and catego-
ries (Fischer and Otnes 2006). To ensure validity codings were crosschecked by an independent 
research assistant (Campbell et al. 2013). 
2.3.2. Mechanisms of free-to-fee switches and the expectation of free services 
The qualitative data analysis shows that most participants viewed a free product or service to 
include an implicit promise by the company of an ongoing free access, without any restrictions 
or need to provide anything in return. Several participants stated that they had not even consid-
ered the possibility of being charged a price in the future. Generally, they do not think about 
companies’ intention to generate profit with these products. In contrast, when customers had to 
pay for the product or service from the beginning, their expectations of the company and upcom-
ing payments were different. Free products are described as something given naturally from 
companies that do not want to take advantage of customers, which shows that a price introduc-
tion is something unexpected and surprising for actual customers of these products.  
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„When I use a free offer, I do not think about any prices that could come up. You can say that 
people are naive! Yes, I would agree with that.”  
(Amelie, 63, female) 
Customers of charged products were more aware of the financial interest of the company and 
understood that they have to give up something in return for product usage (i.e., pay a fee). 
Moreover, it is also important that a decision to pay for a product or service had already been 
made. Participants described the decision of the first payment to be more challenging than think-
ing about paying a higher price for a product that they had already paid for.  
 “You have gotten used to some kind of payment […]. And you have also decided to pay for that 
product, so an upcoming price increase is just an additional payment.” 
(Tilda, 23, female) 
Furthermore, participants demonstrated a greater acceptance of a price increase (versus a free-to-
fee switch) because it was perceived as more common in general. While free-to-fee switches 
only happen from time to time, price increases are part of customers’ daily lives. Thus, in this 
situation, an additional payment is something that customers experienced in the past, while a 
price introduction is perceived as something new and unknown. 
„Because there are price increases everywhere, that’s why I would be more likely to accept it.” 
(Werner, 36, male) 
Several participants also described that a conventional price increase is associated with greater 
convenience than a free-to-fee switch, such as when buying online from a retailer that already 
possesses one’s payment and shipping information: 
 
 31 
 
„Naturally, it [the free-to-fee switch] starts with providing credit card information and other stuff 
for the payment. In case of a price increase, the information is already in the system. It’s also 
about convenience.” 
(Anette, 25, female) 
The interviewed persons also stated that everything works out with the payment and the way the 
company handles their private data (e.g., providing personal information and credit card num-
bers). 
2.3.3. Reactions to the switch and negative consequences 
Participants stated that they had gotten used to certain product functions or services for both a 
free and a fee-based product usage. Further, in a free-to-fee switch, they felt that the company’s 
decision to take away their free access violated their expectations of an ongoing access to the 
product or service without any restrictions. However, the informants did not perceive that their 
rights were violated in a price increase situation, because they are used to giving something in 
return for their usage. Therefore, participants described it as a bigger step to lose their free accus-
tomed access than being asked for an additional price for a charged product or service. 
„You get used to something that is for free and you don’t want the company to take that away 
from you. You don’t want to lose your ‘for free-status’.” 
(Paulo, 24, male) 
If a firm unexpectedly started charging a price for a free product, respondents also felt the com-
pany reneging on the promise to provide a product or service for free. They trusted the company 
to be able to use the product without anything in return. This broken promise led to feelings of 
betrayal, anger, and a high reactance against the required payment for the continued use.  
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 “I would feel betrayed. I think that this is not cool. You get used to certain apps and you like to 
freely use them.” 
(Katharina, 27, female) 
 
„It would make me very angry. It’s just annoying that I have to pay a fee for a service that was of-
fered for free the whole time. And I think I would not do that. I would not pay for it!”  
(Laura, 30, female) 
Thus, a free-to-fee switch results in participants feeling that they have been deceived by the 
company. Several participants also questioned the transparency of the business model when they 
were confronted with a free-to-fee switch because they perceived it as something that was devi-
ously planned by the company in a long term. They supposed that the free offer was a dishonest 
strategy to lure them to pay the price in the future leading to negative emotions of being tricked. 
„They just don’t put their cards on the table. It has to do with the fact that somebody lured me, 
made me get used to something and now they suddenly want my money for it. […] It’s not some-
thing rational, it’s a feeling. I think people’s decisions are based on emotions in this situation.” 
(Amelie, 63, female) 
Stronger feelings of betrayal, anger, lower acceptance, and greater feeling of inconvenience 
when faced with a free-to-fee switch compared to a price increase consequently led to lower 
participants’ intentions to pay for a continued use of the product. Moreover, participants stated 
that the magnitude of price change in the free-to-fee switch was not important because they still 
felt betrayed, even if only a low price was introduced by the company.  
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„It’s not about the amount. It’s about the fact that somebody tricked me and made me get used to 
it and now wants my money.”  
(Amelie, 63, female) 
2.3.4. Mitigation of negative consequences of free-to-fee switches 
Most participants stated that in order to reduce the stronger feelings of betrayal and anger, a good 
reason for the free-to-fee switch should be provided. First, based on their beliefs that they had the 
right to use the product for free for as long as they wanted, they expected the company to provide 
a justification when taking away their free access. Second, a rationale is described as something 
that leads to more transparency, which lacks in the case of an unexpected free-to-fee switch, and 
third, a justification was mentioned as even more important when the price change is uncommon 
(such as in the case of a free-to-fee switch). 
„Something has been taken away from me; that’s why I definitely expect a justification for it!” 
(Anette, 25, female) 
Another way in which a company could justify the free-to-fee switch is providing extra value at 
the same time when the fee is introduced. Participants perceived extra features added to a prod-
uct or service as a valid reason for a price introduction. They stated that something in addition 
could justify the new price. Understanding and accepting the reasons behind the change conse-
quently lead to a better understanding of the necessity of the price change and lower anger. 
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„When they say: ‘We now offer this and that in addition and therefore we introduced the fee’, I 
would have more likely accepted it, compared to a situation where I just don’t know why they had 
to do it.”  
(Werner, 36, male) 
2.4. Customers’ responses to free-to-fee switches 
In order to develop a conceptual model on customer response to free-to-fee switches, we com-
bined the exploratory research findings with existing theories. Cognitive appraisal theory (Laza-
rus 1991) suggests that customers evaluate companies’ motives for changing a price, which con-
sequently leads to their emotional reactions (Watson and Spence 2007), such as feelings of anger 
or betrayal. According to Grégoire and Fisher (2008), betrayal is experienced when the norms 
regulating a relationship between two or more parties are violated. As such, betrayal differs from 
other attitudinal variables, such as dissatisfaction (Bougie et al. 2003), in that it relies on a viola-
tion or infringement of normative standards (Elangovan and Shapiro 1998). Compared to the 
action-driven emotion anger (Bougie et al. 2003), betrayal involves the formation of beliefs 
about a violation. Although the norm violation leading to betrayal may also lead to anger, these 
two reactions differ in their cognitive and emotional nature (Koehler and Gershoff 2003).  
In the case of free products or services, customers perceive the unlimited free access to be the 
norm. When a company reneges on this commitment by introducing a fee, customers may feel 
betrayed because of a violation of their expectation norms, which consequently triggers anger. 
These responses should be less pronounced in a price increase situation, where the expectation 
norms are not violated. Moreover, prior research on the impact of anger on judgment and deci-
sion making indicates that customers are less likely to repurchase a product or service when an-
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ger is increased (e.g., Folkes et al. 1987). Thus, based on both the results of the qualitative inter-
views and cognitive appraisal theory we propose: 
H1:  A free-to-fee switch has stronger negative effects on customers’ (a) feelings of betrayal, 
(b) feelings of anger, and (c) purchase behavior than a price increase of equal magnitude. 
 
H2:  The effect of a free-to-fee switch (vs. a price increase) on purchase behavior is serially 
mediated through feelings of betrayal and anger. 
The qualitative research findings further demonstrate that the stronger feelings of betrayal and 
anger in a free-to-fee switch are accompanied by a weaker focus on the actual magnitude of the 
price change in contrast to a conventional price increase. Consistent with cognitive appraisal 
theory, the negative effect of a free-to-fee switch should be independent of the magnitude of the 
price change, because cognitive appraisal is triggered by the fact that the free access to a product 
or service is taken away, rather than by the magnitude of the required payment (Lazarus 1991). 
Thus, the magnitude of a price change should exert a weaker effect on purchase behavior in the 
case of a free-to-fee switch than in the case of a price increase. 
H3:  The negative effects of a free-to-fee switch (vs. a price increase) are moderated by the 
amount of the price change. Specifically, the effects are stronger when the amount of the 
price change is low. 
Moreover, both our exploratory research and cognitive appraisal theory suggest that providing 
customers with a reason for the price change may mitigate its negative effects (Campbell 1999a). 
Therefore, customers should experience lower feelings of betrayal and anger when a rationale in 
forms of a verbal justification (Kachelmeier et al. 1991) for the price change or extra value of the 
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priced product is provided. In our interviews, participants stated that the unexpected and unfa-
miliar nature of a free-to-fee switch makes the rationale for the price change especially important. 
Thus, due to the different nature of a price introduction (vs. a price increase) as well as the ex-
pected stronger negative reactions (see H1), customers should also experience a greater need for 
a rationale (justification and extra value) in a free-to-fee switch than in a price increase situation. 
In turn, when a rationale is provided, we expect that its mitigating effects will be more effective 
(i.e., stronger) in a free-to-fee switch than in a price increase condition. Thus: 
H4:  The negative effects of a free-to-fee switch (vs. a price increase) are moderated by the 
inclusion of a justification in the price change announcement. Specifically, the negative 
effects are weaker when a justification is included. 
  
H5:  The negative effects of a free-to-fee switch (vs. a price increase) are moderated by 
providing extra value after the price change. Specifically, the negative effects are weaker 
when extra value is provided. 
2.5. Study 2  
2.5.1. Setting and data collection 
To test the proposed hypotheses, we conducted a field experiment. Undergraduate students, en-
rolled in two different courses at a large German university, were offered an opportunity to regis-
ter for a printing service for their course materials. Participants first completed a short question-
naire capturing demographic and control variables, such as usage of tablet computers in the class, 
printer ownership, price-quality perceptions, and price consciousness. Several days later, stu-
dents only received the first half of the printed course materials. They were also informed that 
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for organizational reasons, they would receive the remaining materials at the beginning of the 
second half of the semester. The type of price change (free-to-fee switch vs. price increase) was 
manipulated across the two courses: participants in the first course received the first half of the 
printed course material for free, while participants in the second course paid 3€ (printing out the 
course material at home with an average printer would have cost approximately 6€-7€). In both 
courses, an expectation was set that the second part of the course material would not incur 
any/additional charges. We ensured that students were not enrolled in both classes at the same 
time by selecting two courses that are typically taken at different stages of the program (one un-
dergraduate and one graduate class). We also took these particular classes to minimize the oppor-
tunity that students between the two conditions talk to each other, which we also tried to control 
by checking the posts on the social media facebook groups of the two courses. Six weeks later 
participants were informed that the printing service for the second half of the course materials 
would incur a fee; thus, we unexpectedly introduced a price for students who had received the 
first half of the materials for free and increased the price for students who had already paid a fee. 
Participants stated their purchase decision in an only questionnaire and had to pay the new fee at 
the end of the next lecture to get the second half of the course material. Additionally, we manipu-
lated the magnitude of the price change (moderate + €3 vs. low + €1), providing a justification 
for the price change (no vs. yes) and the inclusion of extra value after the switch (no vs. yes) 
within the two courses. Thus, the experimental setup allows the comparison of eight different 
groups, namely: 1) free-to-fee switch with a moderate price change, 2) price increase with a 
moderate price chance, 3) free-to-fee switch with a low price change, 4) price increase with a 
low price change, 5) free-to-fee switch with a justification, 6) price increase with a justification, 
7) free-to-fee switch with extra value, 8) price increase with extra value, see Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Overview of the experimental setup for Study 2 (field experiment) 
The justification stated: “We are sorry, but due to a last minute loss of university funding, we 
have to introduce/increase the price for the remaining course materials”. Customers’ perception 
of extra value was manipulated by offering two versions of the print-outs for the second half: a 
black-and-white version (no extra value) versus a full color version with binding (extra value) 
(see Appendix B). The extra value manipulations were previously pretested (N = 52, Mage = 
26.32; 55.4 % female). The results confirmed that there were significant differences in perceived 
value between the two versions (Mblack and white = 3.86 vs. Mcolor = 6.18, t(52) = -11.68, p < .01). 
Students’ decision to continue their usage of the service by paying the new/additional fee was 
captured with a questionnaire that also included measures of feelings of betrayal (Grégoire and 
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Fisher 2008, α = .93) and anger (Bougie et al. 2003, α = .89).  The decision to continue the ser-
vice was only counted when the research team actually received the payment for the second half 
of the course material during the next lecture. 
The sample consisted of 378 students (50.5% female; mean age 20.98 years), randomly assigned 
to the experimental conditions. Due to the nature of the hypotheses as well as the field setting 
(which resulted in a limited sample size), a fractional factorial design was used (Box et al. 2005). 
In this design, the two conditions for testing the main effect (i.e., free-to-fee switch +3€ vs. price 
increase +3€) were used again to test the moderating effects of price change magnitude (+1€ vs. 
+3€), providing a justification (no vs. yes) and providing extra value (no vs. yes) (see Figure 5). 
Thus, we reduced the significance level threshold as per Bonferroni adjustment. Moreover, the 
covariates (e.g., gender, age, usage of tablet computers in the class, printer ownership, price-
quality perceptions, and price consciousness) were included for all analyses. 
2.5.2. Testing the effects of price change type and magnitude  
To investigate the effects on the dependent variables betrayal and anger, a MANCOVA analysis 
was conducted. The results show a significant main effect of price change on betrayal 
(F(1, 137) = 11.06, p < .01); participants confronted with a free-to-fee switch experienced a 
greater feeling of betrayal (Mfree-to-fee = 3.86, SE = 1.87) compared to those confronted with a 
price increase (Mprice increase = 2.80, SE = 1.55; t(136) = 5.14, p < .01), consistent with H1a. More-
over, a main effect of price change magnitude on betrayal (F(1, 137) = 5.55, p < .01) was evident, 
with a moderate price change leading to a greater feeling of betrayal than a low price change 
(Mmoderate change= 3.70, SE = 1.71 vs. Mlow change = 2.93, SE = 1.79; t(136) = 2.61, p < .05).  
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Figure 6 shows an illustration of the results. However, the analysis shows no interaction between 
the type of price change and magnitude on betrayal (F(1,137) = 1.11, n.s.).  
 
Figure 6: Paper 1 - The effects of a price introduction vs. a price increase and moderate vs. low price 
change on betrayal 
With regards to perceived anger, the results show a main effect of price change type (F(1, 137) = 
26.82, p < .01), with participants in the free-to-fee condition experiencing a greater feeling of 
anger (Mfree-to-fee = 3.97, SE = 1.68) than those confronted with a price increase (Mprice increase = 
2.50, SE = 1.41; t(136) = 5.59, p < .01), in support of H1b. Additionally, a main effect of price 
change magnitude on anger is present (F(1,137) =11.09, p < .01). A moderate price change leads 
to more anger than a low price change (Mmoderate change = 3.67, SE = 1.63 vs. Mlow change = 2.74, SE 
= 1.67; t(136) = 3.30, p < .01). The significant price change type × price change magnitude inter-
action on anger (F(1,137) = 6.28, p < .05) further indicates that participants confronted with a 
moderate price change experienced a higher feeling of anger in the free-to-fee condition (Mfree-to-
fee = 4.08, SE = 1.65 vs. Mprice increase = 3.26, SE = 1.53; t(66) = 2.11, p < .10), with the effect be-
ing even stronger for the low price change (Mfree-to-fee = 3.85, SE = 1.74 vs. Mprice increase = 1.81, 
SE = .85; t(66) = 6.43, p < .01) (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Paper 1 - The effects of a price introduction vs. a price increase and moderate vs. low price 
change on perceived anger 
With regards to purchase behavior, a logistic regression shows a negative main effect of the type 
of price change (free-to-fee switch vs. price increase) on purchase behavior (β = 2.01, SE = .60, 
z(139) = 3.33, p < .01). 61% of participants in the free-to-fee condition bought the second half 
of the course materials, compared to 89% in the price increase condition (χ2(1) = 20.56, p < .01), 
consistent with H1c. Moreover, the results show a positive main effect of price change magni-
tude (moderate vs. low) (β = 1.31, SE = .60, z(139) = 2.17, p < .05) and an interaction between 
the type of price change and its magnitude (β = 1.90, SE = 1.21, z(139) = 1.57, p < .10). Spe-
cifically, the negative effect of the free-to-fee switch (vs. price increase) is stronger when the 
magnitude of price change is low (+1€) (Purchaseprice increase = 97.40% vs. Purchase free-to-fee  = 
65.60%; χ2 (1) = 12.32, p < .01) compared to a moderate price change (+3€) (Purchaseprice increase 
= 79.40% vs. Purchase free-to-fee = 57.10%; χ2 (1) = 3.94, p < .10), partially supporting H3, see 
Figure 8.  
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Figure 8: Paper 1 - The effects of price introduction vs. price increase and moderate vs. low price change 
on purchase behavior 
To investigate the proposed mediation effect (H2), a process model using the PROCESS SPSS 
macro (Hayes 2013) with 10,000 bootstrap samples was tested (see Figure 9). We report un-
standardized regression coefficients, as these are the preferred metric in causal modeling when 
the independent variable is dichotomous (Hayes 2013, p. 43). Regression results indicate that the 
strength of the effect of price change on purchase behavior via betrayal and anger is moderated 
by price change magnitude (index of moderated mediation: β = 1.03, SE = .52, CI (95%): 2.21 
to .190), such that the mediation is even stronger when the amount of price change is low (β = 
.58, SE = .74, CI (99%): 3.44 to .019) compared to a moderate price change (β = 23, SE 
= .25, CI (90%): .827 to .008). In both conditions, a complete mediation of the effects of the 
type of price change on purchase behavior through feelings of betrayal and anger occurs, sup-
porting H2.  
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A: Moderate price change magnitude (+3€) 
 
B: Low price change magnitude (+1€) 
 
Note: Covariates included are usage of tablet computers in the class, printer ownership, price-quality perceptions, price con-
sciousness, gender, age; dashed line indicates non-significant path; *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < .10, n.s. = p > .10. 
Figure 9: Paper 1 - Mediation model of price introduction vs. price increase on purchases with amount of 
price change (moderate vs. low) as a moderator 
     
2.5.3. Testing the effects of justification 
A MANCOVA analysis shows no main effect of price change (F(1,144) = .37, n.s.), but a main 
effect of justification on betrayal (F(1,144) = 4.74, p < .05), such that providing a justification 
leads to a decrease in feelings of betrayal (Mno justification= 3.67, SE = 1.63 vs. Mjustification = 3.05, 
SE = 1.46; t(142) = 2.40, p < .05), see Figure 10. No significant interaction between price 
change type and justification (F(1,144) = 2.85, n.s.) is evident (rejection of H4a). 
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Figure 10: Paper 1 - The effects of a price introduction vs. a price increase and providing a justification 
(no vs. yes) on betrayal 
With regards to the feeling of anger, no main effect of price change type (F(1,144) =.48, n.s.) is 
present, however a main effect of justification exists (F(1, 144) = 10.02, p < .01), such that feel-
ings of anger are lower when justification is present (Mno justification= 3.67, SE = 1.63 vs. Mjustification 
= 3.05, SE = 1.46; t(142) = 2.40, p < .05). Additionally, a price change × justification interaction 
exists (F(1, 144) = 6.18, p < .05). Specifically, the increasing effect of a free-to-fee switch on 
anger only occurs when no justification is provided (M free-to-fee = 4.08, SE = 1.82 vs. M price increase 
= 3.26, SE = 1.53; t(66) = 2.11, p < .05), while there are no differences between the two price 
change types when a justification is present (Mfree-to-fee = 2.57, SE = 1.21 vs. Mprice increase = 3.08, 
SE = 1.67; t(142) = 1.48, n.s.), supporting H4b, see Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Paper 1 - The effects of a free-to-fee switch vs. a price increase and providing a justification 
(no vs. yes) on anger 
With regard to the effect of providing a justification on purchase behavior, a logistic regression 
shows a main effect of justification (no vs. yes) (β = .89, SE = .42, z(147) = 2.13, p < .05), but no 
main effect of price change type (free-wo-fee switch vs. price increase) (β = .56, SE = .42, 
z(147) = 1.35, n.s.) and no price change × justification interaction (β = 1.00, SE = .83, z(147) = 
1.21, n.s.). However, the interaction term approaches significance (p = .12) and a spotlight analy-
sis reveals significant differences in purchase frequency between the two price change conditions 
(i.e., free-to-fee switch vs. price increase), depending on whether a justification is provided. 
Without a justification, a free-to-fee switch leads to less purchases than a price increase (Pur-
chasefree-to-fee = 57.10% vs. Purchaseprice increase = 79.40%; χ
2 
(1) = 3.94, p < .10), while there is no 
difference when a justification is provided (Purchasefree-to-fee = 84.20% vs. Purchaseprice increase = 
85.00%; χ2 (1) = .01, n.s.), partially supporting H4c, see Figure 12.         
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Figure 12: Paper 1 - The effects of a free-to-fee switch vs. a price increase and providing a justification 
(no vs. yes) on purchase behavior 
A regression, using the PROCESS SPSS macro with 10,000 bootstrap samples, indicates that the 
mediation of the purchase decision by betrayal and anger is moderated by providing a justifica-
tion for the price change (Figure 13) (index of moderated mediation: β = .82, SE = .43, CI 
(99%): .011 to 2.33). The negative effect of a free-to-fee switch vs. a price increase on purchase 
behavior is mediated by betrayal and anger when no justification is provided (β = 23, SE = .25, 
CI (90%): .827 to .008), while there is no effect in the justification condition (β = .11, SE 
= .29, CI (90%): .166 to .640).   
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A: No justification 
 
B: Justification 
 
Note: Covariates included are usage of tablet computers in the class, printer ownership, price-quality perceptions, price con-
sciousness, gender, age; dashed line indicates non-significant path; *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < .10, n.s. = p > .10. 
Figure 13: Paper 1 - Mediation model of price introduction vs. price increase on purchases with justifica-
tion (no vs. yes) as a moderator 
2.5.4. Testing the effect of providing extra value 
A MANCOVA indicates a main effect of the price change type on betrayal (F(1, 148) = 5.18, p 
< .05) (Mfree-to-fee= 3.61, SE = 1.74 vs. Mprice increase = 2.88, SE = 1.61; t(146) = 2.66, p < .01) and a 
direct effect of extra value on betrayal (F(1, 148) = 8.56, p < .01) (Mno extra value= 3.70, SE = 1.71 
vs. Mextra value = 2.86, SE = 1.63; t(146) = 3.05, p < .01), but no interaction between the type of 
price change and extra value (F(1, 148) = .01, n.s.). Figure 14 illustrates the results. 
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Figure 14: Paper 1 - The effects of a price introduction vs. a price increase and providing extra value (no 
vs. yes) on betrayal 
Moreover, no main effect of the type of price change on anger is present (F(1,148) = .84, n.s.), 
but the main effect of extra value on anger is significant (F(1, 148) = 8.28, p < .01), such that 
providing extra value leads to less anger (Mno extra value= 3.67, SE = 1.63 vs. Mextra value = 2.84, SE 
= 1.70; t(148) = 3.01, p < .01). Moreover, the price change × justification interaction is signifi-
cant (F(1, 148) = 3.74, p < .10). The spotlight analysis shows a negative effect of a free-to-fee 
switch (vs. a price increase) on anger in the no extra value condition (M free-to-fee = 4.08, SE = 1.82 
vs. M price increase = 3.26, SE = 1.53; t(66) = 2.11, p < .05), no differences in anger between these 
two groups are present when extra value is provided (Mfree-to-fee = 2.79, SE = 1.71 vs. Mprice increase 
= 2.90, SE = 1.71; t(66) = -.28, n.s.), as illustrated in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Paper 1 - The effects of a free-to-fee switch vs. a price increase and providing extra value (no 
vs. yes) on anger 
Logistic regression with purchase behavior as the dependent variable shows a main effect of 
providing extra value (β = .76, SE = .40, z(150) = 1.88, p < .10). In addition, no main effect of 
price change type (price increase vs. free-to-fee switch) (β = -.66, SE = .40, z(150) = 1.64, n.s.) 
and no interaction between the type of price change and extra value is present (β = .80, SE = .80, 
z(150) = 1.00, n.s.). However, the type of price change x extra value interaction approaches sig-
nificance (p = .16) and the spotlight analysis shows that when no extra value is provided, there 
are differences in the effect of price change type (Purchaseprice increase 79.40 percent vs. Purchase-
free-to-fee = 57.10 percent; χ2 (1) = 3.93, p < .10) on purchase behavior, while no significant differ-
ence exists when extra value is provided (Purchaseprice increase = 84.60 percent vs. Purchasefree-to-fee 
81.00 percent; χ2 (1) = .19, n.s.), supporting H5 (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16: Paper 1 - The effects of a price introduction vs. a price increase and providing extra value (no 
vs. yes) on purchase behavior   
A regression using the PROCESS procedure shows again a total mediation of the effect of the 
type of price change on purchase behavior via betrayal and anger. However, there is no moderat-
ing effect of extra value on the effect of the price change type on betrayal (β = .06, SE = .54, 
t(144) = .10, n.s.) or anger (β = -.92, SE = .55, t(144) = -1.69, n.s.) and therefore also no moder-
ated mediation (Figure 17). 
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A: No extra value 
 
B: extra value 
 
Note: Covariates included are usage of tablet computers in the class, printer ownership, price-quality perceptions, price con-
sciousness, gender, age; dashed line indicates non-significant path; *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < .10, n.s. = p > .10. 
Figure 17: Paper 1 - Mediation model of price introduction vs. price increase on purchases with extra 
value (no vs. yes) as a moderator 
2.5.5. Discussion of the results  
Our experimental study shows that introducing a price for a product or service that was previous-
ly for free leads to stronger feelings of betrayal (H1a) and anger (H1b), consequently resulting in 
lower purchases (H1c, H2) than a price increase of equal magnitude. The findings also indicate 
that the negative effect of a free-to-fee switch (vs. a price increase) on purchase behavior is even 
stronger for smaller price changes (H3). However, there is also a direct effect in a small price 
change of a free-to-fee switch on anger, showing that the feeling of betrayal cannot explain the 
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whole effect on the purchase decision. Moreover, we find support for the assumption that, in 
contrast to a price increase, the negative consequences of a free-to-fee switch can be effectively 
mitigated by providing a justification (H4) and extra value while introducing the price (H5). A 
justification for the price change and extra value had a stronger attenuating effect in a free-to-fee 
switch than in a conventional price increase.  
2.6. General discussion 
This research provides important contributions to the marketing literature and to behavioral pric-
ing theory. Specifically, utilizing a mixed-methods approach, our work bridges the gap between 
research on price introductions (i.e., free-to-fee switches) and price increases by directly compar-
ing both and by identifying differences in customers’ reactions across the two types of price 
changes. Moreover, by identifying the theoretical mechanism underlying the effects of different 
types of price changes on purchase behavior, our investigation contributes to research on percep-
tions and emotions following pricing decisions. We found that the violation of expectations in 
free-to-fee switches leads to feelings of betrayal and anger. While anger also leads to a decrease 
in purchases, the feeling of betrayal increases anger, but does not directly affect the short-term 
purchase decision, consistent with previous research on negative long-term effects of betrayed 
customers (Grégoire and Fisher 2008).  
Our research offers important insights for managers considering free-to-fee switches in the media 
and entertainment industry. We show that managers need to expect greater feelings of betrayal 
and anger among their customers when conducting a free-to-fee switch compared to a price in-
crease. In addition, our findings suggest that lowering the magnitude of the introduced fee will 
not reduce these negative consequences. Thus, it is not recommended to try and use price change 
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magnitude as an option to decrease negative consequences of a free-to-fee switch. However, our 
investigation identifies an alternative way in which managers can mitigate the negative conse-
quences of free-to-fee switches: by providing a rationale for the price change (e.g., justification 
or extra value).  
When interpreting the results of this research, some limitations should be taken into account. 
Future research should validate the findings with a broader sample, at different price levels, in-
cluding different initial prices in the price increase condition, and for additional product catego-
ries. Moreover, additional factors which could potentially attenuate the negative consequences of 
free-to-fee switches should be considered, such as the timing of the price introduction an-
nouncement. To further expand our knowledge of the effects of free-to-fee switches, future stud-
ies should also consider whether and how the strength of the relationship with the company af-
fects customers’ reaction to the switch as well as the effects of sunk costs after the first payment. 
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3. Paper 2: Free no More - The Effects of Choice Options in Unexpected 
Free-to-Fee Switches 
3.1. Abstract 
Many companies struggle with the consequences of introducing prices for previously free prod-
ucts, referred to as free-to-fee switches. This research investigates the effects of different types of 
unexpected free-to-fee switches by comparing a forced switch, in which companies introduce a 
price without giving customers additional options of continued usage of the product, to a freemi-
um switch, in which customers have the additional option to use a product with reduced features 
for free. Integrating price fairness theory and the concept of cannibalization, a series of four ex-
perimental studies reveals detrimental effects of free-to-fee switches on perceptions of fairness, 
attitude toward the company, and purchase intentions for the fee-based product. However, these 
negative effects on fairness and attitude may partly be attenuated by a freemium switch. Ways 
for further improving the effectiveness of freemium as well as forced free-to-fee switches are 
examined. Overall, the findings question the common practice of unexpectedly introducing 
freemium business models. The research contributes to a better understanding of customer reac-
tions to free-to-fee switches and provides recommendations for companies intending to introduce 
a price for free products or services. 
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 56 
 
3.2. Introduction 
Companies frequently introduce products or services for free and begin to unexpectedly charge a 
fee after reaching a certain level of awareness and acceptance within the target group. This prac-
tice is known as a free-to-fee switch (Pauwels and Weiss 2008) and defined as a business model 
change from offering a free product or service to a required payment by introducing a price. Un-
expected free-to-fee switches are common across many industries (e.g., Steven 2006), including 
travel (e.g., introduction of baggage fees), hospitality (e.g., introduction of fees for hotel Internet 
access), banking (e.g., introduction of checking account fees), or media and entertainment (e.g., 
introduction of fees for online content). 
Recent examples of unexpected free-to-fee switches include the mobile messaging app 
WhatsApp starting to charge an annual fee of US$.99 in 2012 (Dredge 2013), the introduction of 
the Chicago Tribune’s paywall for online content (Marek 2012), or electric car maker Tesla’s 
decision to no longer offer complimentary vehicle charging (Stewart 2016). When such a free-to-
fee switch occurs, existing customers are faced with a decision of whether to start paying for the 
previously free product or to terminate its use. The challenge for companies is to minimize cus-
tomers’ unfavorable reactions, such as deterioration in attitudes and customer churn. Unantici-
pated negative reactions may prove costly and, in extreme cases, may even lead to companies 
reverting back to the free business model. For example, Bank of America announced a monthly 
US$5 debit card fee in 2011, only to drop the plans for its introduction after experiencing signifi-
cant customer outrage (Mui 2011). Similarly, the New York Times terminated its paid Internet 
service and – temporarily – returned to offering free access to its online content after a slew of 
negative reactions in 2007 (Macmillan 2007).  
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Finding a balance between offering products and services for free and demanding a fee has re-
cently been identified as one of the most relevant areas for future research in digital marketing 
(Kannan and Li 2017). However, although unexpected free-to-fee switches appear to be a com-
mon phenomenon, existing research focuses on price introductions in the form of trial versions 
or free samples (e.g., Faugère and Tayi 2007; Scott 1976), where consumers expect to pay for the 
product or service in the future. Other studies center on potential business models before or after 
the switch, without considering the price introduction itself (e.g., Halbheer et al. 2014; Lam-
brecht and Misra 2017; Reid 2002a; Reid 2002b; Wlömert and Papies 2016). To the best of our 
knowledge, unexpected free-to-fee switches and customers’ reactions have not been addressed in 
prior research. The purpose of our investigation is therefore to shed light on customers’ respons-
es to unexpected free-to-fee switches and to determine ways in which the assumed negative con-
sequences can be minimized. Specifically, this is the first research to distinguish between two 
common types of unexpected free-to-fee switches: (1) a forced free-to-fee switch, in which com-
panies begin charging a fee for a previously free product or service (e.g., WhatsApp); and (2) a 
freemium free-to-fee switch (Kumar 2014), in which companies begin charging a fee for a previ-
ously free product, but at the same time also provide customers with an option of using a func-
tionally reduced product version for free (e.g., Chicago Tribune’s paywall). While some re-
searchers equate the term “free-to-fee switch” with the move from a free to a freemium business 
model (e.g., Pauwels and Weiss 2008), this investigation is the first to additionally consider the 
common practice of a forced free-to-fee switch.  
To develop the conceptual model, we build upon equity theory (Adams 1965) and integrate the 
fair outcome effect (van den Bos et al. 1997), the fair process effect (Thibaut and Walker 1975), 
and the concept of cannibalization (Srinivasan et al. 2005). Four studies, utilizing different ex-
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perimental designs and samples from different consumer populations, test the proposed theoreti-
cal model. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate customers’ negative responses to an unexpected free-to-
fee switch for both forced and freemium switches. Compared to a forced switch, a freemium 
switch is found to be less detrimental regarding perceived fairness of the switch and attitude to-
ward the company, while the effect on purchase intentions is less negative in a forced switch. 
Subsequent studies build upon the initial findings and focus on determining how customers’ neg-
ative responses to the switch can be attenuated. Specifically, Study 3 investigates how to enhance 
perceived outcome fairness by offering different levels of a free version in a freemium switch, 
while Study 4 focuses on enhancing procedural fairness, such as by providing a justification for 
the switch.  
On a theoretical level, we propose that adding a choice option in a freemium switch beneficially 
affects fairness perceptions, but cannibalizes the intention to buy the fee-based product. Thus, the 
present research is the first to contribute to behavioral pricing theory by integrating theoretical 
aspects of customers’ fairness perceptions with the concept of cannibalization and applying them 
to the free-to-fee switching context in order to develop a better understanding of offering a free-
mium choice option. In addition to the theoretical contributions, our research offers important 
managerial implications for companies considering free-to-fee switches, as the question of how 
to effectively implement these switches with minimal negative consequences is relevant across 
numerous industries.  
3.3. Price introductions and freemium business models  
Existing research has considered different forms of price introductions, such as product trials 
(e.g., Cheng and Liu 2008; Cheng and Tang 2010), free samples (e.g., Bawa and Shoemaker 
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2004), different subscription systems (e.g., Pauwels and Weiss 2008), and ancillary fees (e.g., 
Bower and Maxham 2012; Koukova et al. 2012; Tuzovic et al. 2014). While most of these stud-
ies investigate situations in which customers expect that they would eventually have to start pay-
ing for a product, recent examples of banks (e.g., Bank of America), mobile phone apps (e.g., 
WhatsApp), or news providers (e.g., Chicago Tribune) demonstrate that customers can unex-
pectedly encounter a free-to-fee switch.  
Related research investigates consumers’ acceptance of fee-based business models (e.g., Choi et 
al. 2009; Punj 2015), consumers’ willingness to pay for fee-based services (e.g., Clemons 2009), 
and the value of free products (e.g., Baumbach 2016; Haruvy and Prasad 2001; Hossain and 
Saini 2015; Shampanier et al. 2007). However, these studies focus on business models either 
before or after the switch, but not on customers’ reactions to the switch itself. However, the find-
ing that price effects, such as those of reference prices, are most pronounced immediately after a 
price change (Fibich et al. 2005), underlines the need for research on reactions to a free-to-fee 
switch. 
When switching from free to fee, companies can utilize different strategies (Anderson 2009; 
Witell and Löfgren 2013), such as: (1) introducing a price without changing the product; or (2) 
introducing a fee for the existing product and at the same time introducing a product version with 
reduced features for free. The second – freemium – business strategy (Kumar 2014) is commonly 
utilized by online content providers and services. The idea behind the freemium model is to pro-
vide customers with an opportunity to try the product with limited functionality for free, while 
simultaneously allowing them to purchase the full version (Kannan and Li 2017). Such a strategy 
may increase the number of users (Cheng and Tang 2010) by attracting consumers who would 
otherwise refrain from using the fee-based product (Papies et al. 2011), but at the same time, the 
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availability of a free version was recently found to cannibalize demand for the fee-based product 
(Arora et al. 2017). However, the psychological mechanism that explains customers’ reactions to 
different types of free-to-fee switches has not been sufficiently considered. We propose that an 
unexpected price introduction triggers changes in consumers’ fairness perceptions, similarly to 
those experienced in the context of price increases (e.g., Bolton et al. 2003; Xia et al. 2004), but 
that this effect differs between a forced and a freemium free-to-fee switch. 
Investigations about freemium business models are rare and often limited to products that are 
characterized by lock-in effects, in which users have to invest effort and time to learnand adapt a 
product (Hung-Pin 2012). One example is the company Adobe Systems Inc. providing the free 
PDF Reader software, which allows customers to use the special data format, thereby creating a 
lock-in effect, while also selling other products, such as the PDF Writer, in return (Parker and 
Van Alstyne 2005). Other companies utilize the free version in a freemium business model as a 
way to build up their user base, especially when the provided product or service becomes more 
beneficial with an increasing number of users (e.g., social networks, such as LinkedIn). While 
research has investigated a freemium business model as a way to create lock-in effects (e.g., 
Cheng and Tang 2010), not much is known about the influence of freemium in product catego-
ries that are not subject to lock-in effects.  
In sum, while different strategies for free-to-fee switches exist, little is known about customers’ 
reactions to different switching options and the psychological mechanism behind it. The objec-
tive of our research is therefore to address these questions and to further identify factors that may 
attenuate the negative consequences of different types of unexpected free-to-fee switches. 
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3.4. Fairness in free-to-fee switches: conceptual development 
An important concept in understanding customers’ reactions to price introductions and price 
changes is perceived fairness, predominantly investigated in the context of price increases (e.g., 
Bolton et al. 2003; Xia et al. 2004). Perceived fairness can be defined as customers’ judgement 
as to whether an outcome and/or the process leading to an outcome is reasonable, acceptable, and 
just (Bolton et al. 2003). Thus, two key aspects of perceived fairness are the outcome and the 
procedure leading to the outcome. In the context of free-to-fee switches, what a consumer re-
ceives (i.e., the product and its features) relative to what she has to sacrifice to receive it (i.e., the 
newly introduced product price) represents the outcome, while the process of implementing a 
free-to-fee switch can be seen as the procedure leading to the outcome.    
The perceived fairness of an outcome is conceptualized as distributive justice, which is judged 
based upon the distribution of rewards (i.e., what one receives; also referred to as an output) re-
sulting from the investments (i.e., what one has to give up; also referred to as an input or sacri-
fice) of different exchange parties into their relationship/transaction (Adams 1965). Equal ratios 
of rewards to investments between the exchange parties result in perceptions of fairness while 
unequal ratios lead to perceived unfairness. However, as customers typically are not aware of 
sellers’ investments, they may instead compare one transaction with a reference transaction of 
the same or a similar product (representing an output), but at a different price point (representing 
an input) (Kuester et al. 2015; Xia et al. 2004). In a free-to-fee switch, the reference point to 
which the new transaction (i.e., paying a fee in order to use the product or service) will mostly 
likely be compared to is the previously free product. When a customer is charged a higher fee 
than a reference transaction, perceptions of fairness should decline. Based on the fair outcome 
effect, which refers to the positive influence of perceived distributive fairness on subsequent 
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behavioral responses when consumers receive outcome information before process information 
(van den Bos et al. 1997), the perceived fairness should affect subsequent behavioral responses, 
with lower fairness leading to more negative responses.  
Related to the concept of price fairness is equity theory, which postulates that individuals make 
price judgments by comparing output-input ratios of different alternatives (Adams 1965). Trans-
actions are evaluated as unfair if these ratios are perceived to be inequivalent, with the perceived 
unfairness being less severe when the inequality is to the buyer’s advantage (i.e., a larger ratio) 
than when it is to the buyer’s disadvantage (i.e., a lower ratio) (Ordóñez et al. 2000). Thus, dif-
ferences across output-input ratios should lead to a feeling of injustice. Similar to a price increase, 
an unexpected free-to-fee switch represents an increase in the necessary input or sacrifice (e.g., 
required payment increases from zero to US$2.69), while the output (e.g., product features) re-
mains unchanged. As a consequence, the customer’s output-input ratio declines. A decrease in 
the ratio should lead to lower fairness perception, which should consequently negatively affect 
customers’ attitudes and behavioral reactions (Peine et al. 2008), consistent with the fair outcome 
effect (van den Bos et al. 1997). Thus: 
H1:  An unexpected free-to-fee switch (a) reduces customers’ perceived fairness, (b) leads to 
less a favorable attitude toward the company, and (c) reduces usage intentions of the fee-
based product. 
In addition, differences between consumers’ responses to a forced and a freemium switch should 
exist. If a customer confronted with a freemium switch chooses to pay for the full product ver-
sion, the output-input ratio decreases – similar to a forced switch. However, when customers 
decide not to pay for the product (i.e., input = zero), those customers who have an option of us-
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ing a product with reduced features for free (i.e., a freemium switch) have a higher outcome (i.e., 
output = a product with low functionality) than those in the forced switch, who do not have a free 
option (i.e., output = no product). Thus, given the same input, the possible output for a freemium 
switch is higher than that for the forced switch, which should lead to a larger perceived output 
relative to the input for the freemium switch. This greater output-input ratio should lead to more 
favorable perceptions in the freemium than in the forced switch. Thus, even though both forced 
and freemium switch should lead to a deterioration of customers’ fairness perception and attitude 
toward the company, these negative effects should be attenuated in a freemium switch.    
While we expect a freemium switch to attenuate negative effects on customers’ perceptions rela-
tive to a forced switch, its effect on customer purchase behavior should be more complex. On the 
one hand, being able to use a free reduced product instead of paying for the full version in a 
freemium model allows customers to continue their usage for free, although with less features. 
Thus, an existence of an additional free alternative is likely to cannibalize the usage of a fee-
based product version (Arora et al. 2017; Cheng and Tang 2010). Therefore: 
H2:  Compared to a forced free-to-fee switch, a freemium switch attenuates deterioration in (a) 
customers’ fairness perceptions and (b) attitude toward the company, while at the same 
time it (c) enhances deterioration in purchase intentions for the fee-based product. 
At the same time, based on the fair outcome effect (van den Bos et al. 1997), we also predict a 
positive relationship between fairness perceptions and downstream customers’ responses. Ac-
cording to the relationships hypothesized in H2a and b, due to the enhanced fairness relative to 
the forced switch, a freemium switch should indirectly lead to more favorable attitudes and 
therefore greater intentions to pay the new fee. In addition, Reinders et al. (2008) show that a 
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forced use of a new service induces negative attitudes toward that service, indirectly leading to 
adverse effects on customers’ behavioral intentions. Hence: 
H3:  Compared to a forced free-to-fee switch, a freemium switch has a positive indirect effect on 
purchase intentions for the fee-based product through higher fairness perceptions and a 
more favorable attitude toward the company. 
In sum, we predict competitive mediation (Zhao et al. 2010) that encompasses both a negative 
direct effect and a positive indirect effect of a freemium (versus forced) switch on consumers’ 
purchase intentions. First, based on likely product cannibalization, giving customers an option to 
choose between a free reduced version and a fee-based full version (i.e., a freemium model) is 
expected to directly lead to lower purchase intentions for the fee-based product (H2c). Second, 
based on equity theory and the fair outcome effect, fairness perceptions and attitude toward the 
company are expected to be higher in the freemium (versus forced) switch (H2a and b), which 
should indirectly increase purchase intentions of the fee-based product (H3). 
3.5. Study 1 
3.5.1. Method 
To test hypotheses 1-3, we conducted a mixed design online experiment with one within-subjects 
factor (free-to-fee switch: yes vs. no) and one between-subjects factor (a forced vs. a freemium 
switch) in a mobile app product context. The analyzable sample consists of 65 undergraduate 
students, who completed the Study for extra class credit. The sample characteristics (Mage = 22.9 
years, SD = 2.44; 43.1% female) are consistent with the main target group for mobile apps, 
which ranges in age from 18 to 29 years (Pew Research Center 2015). 
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To be able to investigate the within-subjects effects of a free-to-fee switch, we assessed respond-
ents’ fairness perceptions, attitude toward the company, and usage/purchase intentions of the 
product two weeks before (t1) and directly after the experimental treatment (t2). All participants 
were first shown detailed information about a fictional free data backup app for their mobile 
phone (see Appendix E (I)). Participants responded to established multiple-item scales capturing 
their fairness perceptions of the offer (Kukar-Kinney et al. 2007; αt1 = .79), attitude toward the 
company (Goldsmith et al. 2001; αt1 = .80) and usage intentions of the free product (Chattopadh-
yay and Basu 1990; αt1 = .91). Furthermore, we measured technological anxiety (Barbeite and 
Weiss 2004; αt1 = .94), general app use (Mathwick and Rigdon 2004; αt1 = .87), gender, and age 
as possible covariates. Two weeks later (t2), the same participants were again shown the details 
of the app’s functionality and were asked to imagine having used it in the meantime. To increase 
experimental realism, the app usage was simulated with a series of screenshots of the app’s func-
tions (see Appendix E (II)). Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of the two experi-
mental groups (a forced vs. a freemium switch). In the forced switch condition, participants read 
that unless they paid a new annual fee (€2.69), they would be unable to continue using the app. 
In the freemium switch condition, participants additionally had an option to continue using a 
functionally restricted product version for free (see Appendix E (III)). Subsequently, the de-
pendent variables were captured again (fairness perceptions, αt2 = .73; attitude toward the com-
pany, αt2 = .76; purchase intentions of the fee-based product version, αt2 = .94). We used similar 
operationalization for usage intentions (i.e., intention to use the initially free app in t1) and pur-
chase intentions (i.e., intention to buy the app in t2) to be able to directly compare behavioral 
intentions across the two points in time. All measures exhibited satisfactory psychometric char-
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acteristics. Appendix C lists all measures and their psychometric properties, Appendix D the 
construct correlations. 
3.5.2. Results 
A repeated-measures ANCOVA showed that an unexpected free-to-fee switch led to decreases in 
fairness perceptions (F(1, 59) = 4.16, p < .05), attitude toward the company (F(1, 59) = 4.14, p 
< .05), and usage/purchase intentions (F(1, 59) = 5.65, p < .05), supporting H1a-c. While deterio-
ration of fairness perceptions was significant in both forced and freemium conditions (Mforced 
(t2−t1) = −1.81, SD = .81, t (35) = −13.25, p < .001; Mfreemium (t2−t1) = −1.19, SD = 1.05, t (30) = 
−6.21, p < .001), a difference between the two types of switches existed (F(1, 59) = 7.39, p < .01), 
with the decrease being significantly smaller in the freemium than in the forced condition, sup-
porting H2a. The unexpected free-to-fee switch also resulted in less positive attitude toward the 
company in both conditions (Mforced (t2−t1) = −1.09, SD = 1.12, t (35) = −5.73, p < .001; Mfreemium 
(t2−t1) = −.59, SD = .69, t (30) = −4.65, p < .001), with this negative effect again being weaker in 
the freemium condition (F(1, 59) = 4.48, p < .05), supporting H2b. Moreover, in support of H2c, 
an effect in the opposite direction was found for usage/purchase intentions: The significant re-
duction in behavioral intentions (Mforced (t2−t1) = −.83, SD = .95, t (35) = −5.15, p < .001; Mfreemi-
um (t2−t1) = −1.47, SD = 1.45, t (30) = − 5.56, p < .001) was smaller in the forced compared to the 
freemium condition (F(1, 59) = 3.46, p < .10). Figure 18 illustrates the mean within-subjects 
differences. The effects of the covariates were not significant.  
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Figure 18: Paper 2 - Study 1: Within-subjects mean differences 
To investigate the competitive mediation effect of the switching options through fairness percep-
tions and attitude toward the company (i.e., serial mediation) on purchase intentions, we ana-
lyzed a conditional process model based on the repeated measures results (t2−t1), using the 
PROCESS SPSS macro by Hayes (2013) with 10,000 bootstrap samples. Regression results indi-
cated non-significant effects of all covariates. In support of H3, the indirect effect of the switch-
ing option on purchase intentions via fairness perception and attitude toward the company was 
significant and positive (B =.07, SE = .05, 95% bootstrap CI: .008 to .241). In addition to this 
positive indirect effect, the negative direct effect of the switching option on purchase intentions 
remained significant (B = .73, SE = .32, t(59) =2.31, p < .05; see Figure 19). 
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Note: Covariates included are app use, technological anxiety, gender and age; dashed line indicates non-significant path; 
*** = p < .01, ** = p < .05 
Figure 19: Paper 2 - Study 1: Indirect effects of switching option on purchase intentions for the fee-based 
product 
3.5.3. Discussion 
Study 1 shows that both forced and freemium unexpected free-to-fee switches lead to a deteriora-
tion in customers’ fairness perceptions, attitude toward the company, and intentions to use/pay 
for the fee-based product (H1a-c). Additionally, as hypothesized, the negative effects on fairness 
perceptions and attitudes are smaller in the freemium than in the forced switch (H2a-b), leading 
to an indirect positive effect of a freemium (versus a forced) switch on purchase intentions (H3). 
At the same time, a freemium switch leads to cannibalization of the fee-based product, as the 
availability of a free alternative with reduced features directly lowers purchase intentions for the 
fee-based product (H2c). 
Overall, Study 1 provides initial insights into the negative effects of unexpected free-to-fee 
switches, differences between two common types of switches, and the underlying process 
through perceived fairness of the offer. At the same time, the generalizability of the findings may 
be limited due to the nature of the selected product, as a data backup app addresses functional 
needs and thus represents a utilitarian product (O’Curry and Strahilevitz 2001). According to 
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Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000), customers’ choice and preferences depend on the nature of the 
product, with hedonic products, characterized by pleasure and fun, eliciting greater preferences 
than utilitarian items. Recently, Arora et al. (2017) found that the cannibalization effect of an 
available free app version is stronger for hedonic apps. Therefore, Study 2 assesses the generali-
zability of the findings by replicating Study 1 in a hedonic product context and by using a broad-
er sample with a different research design. 
3.6. Study 2 
3.6.1. Method 
Study 2 was a between-subjects online experiment, which allowed us to focus on two manipulat-
ed factors: switching option (a forced vs. a freemium switch) and product category (utilitarian vs. 
hedonic). In contrast to the student sample of Study 1, we recruited an analyzable sample of 187 
German consumers through a market research company. Respondents (Mage = 44 years, SD = 
13.84; 51.3% female) were members of an actively managed online consumer panel and received 
an incentive of €1.50 for completing the survey.  
Participants in the utilitarian condition were shown detailed information about the same data 
backup app used in Study 1, while participants in the hedonic condition viewed information 
about a photo editor app (see Appendix E (IV-VI)). Hedonic goods address customers’ desire 
for fun and provide an affective experience (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982). A photo editor app 
with different options to individualize pictures and a focus on customers’ creativity represents 
such a product. In a pretest with 106 undergraduate students (Mage = 21.8 years, SD = 5.47; 
50.9% female), the backup app was perceived as more functional than the photo editor app (Mdata 
backup = 5.51, SE = 1.44 vs. Mphoto editor = 4.92, SE = 1.23, t(104) = 2.25, p < .05), while the photo 
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editor app was perceived as more entertaining (Mdata backup = 2.15, SE = 1.22 vs. Mphoto editor = 3.86, 
SE = 1.61, t(104) = 5.91, p < .01); both measured on a 7-point Likert-scale. As in Study 1, to 
increase experimental realism, the respondents were shown images of smartphone screens simu-
lating actual app usage (e.g., Appendix E (II) and (V)). We used the same switching option 
manipulation as in Study 1. Participants in the forced condition were told that, unless they paid 
the new annual fee (€2.69), they would be unable to continue using the app, while participants in 
the freemium condition had an additional option of using an app version with restricted function-
ality for free. The same dependent variables and covariates as in Study 1 were measured (see 
Appendix C). 
3.6.2. Results 
A manipulation check supported the pretest results. The data backup app was perceived as more 
functional than the photo editor app (Mdata backup = 4.35, SE = 1.53 vs. Mphoto editor = 3.85, SE = 
1.60, t(185) = 2.62, p < .01), while the photo editor app was seen as more entertaining (Mdata 
backup = 3.53, SE = 1.52 vs. Mphoto editor = 4.36, SE = 1.65, t(185) = -4.33, p < .01).  
ANCOVA results revealed that, regardless of the type of product (utilitarian vs. hedonic), the 
switching option had a significant impact on customers’ fairness perceptions (F(1,181) = 9.46, p 
< .01), attitude toward the company (F(1, 181) = 1.80, p < .10), and purchase intentions of the 
fee-based product (F(1, 181) = 2.36, p < .10). Spotlight analyses revealed that, compared to the 
forced switch, respondents exposed to the freemium switch had higher fairness perceptions 
(Mforced = 3.30, SE = 1.52 vs. Mfreemium = 3.97, SE = 1.48, t(185) = 3.09, p < .01) and a more 
favorable attitude toward the company (Mforced = 3.78, SE = 1.57 vs. Mfreemium= 4.11, SE = 1.58, 
t(185) = 1.42, p < .10), but lower purchase intentions (Mforced = 2.91, SE = 1.79 vs. Mfreemium = 
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2.50, SE = 1.80, t(185) = 1.54, p < .10), supporting H2a-c. At the same time, the non-significant 
product category × switching option interaction confirmed that the proposed relationships are 
independent of the type of product, see Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: Paper 2 - Study 2: Between-subjects mean differences 
To analyze the competitive mediating effect of fairness perception and attitude toward the com-
pany on purchase intentions, we again tested a process model. Consistent with H3 and Study 1 
findings, the indirect effect of the freemium vs. forced switch on purchase intentions via fairness 
perceptions and attitude toward the company was significant and positive (B =.26, SE = .10, 
99% bootstrap CI: .048 to .600). Additionally, a negative direct effect on purchase intentions (B 
= .69, SE = .21, t(181) =3.25, p < .01; H2c) was evident, while no interaction effect was pre-
sent. Moreover, no significant effects of the covariates were found, see Figure 21. 
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Note: Covariates included are app use, technological anxiety, gender and age; dashed line indicates non-significant path; 
*** = p < .01, ** = p < .05 
Figure 21: Paper 2 - Study 2: Indirect effects of switching option on purchase intentions for the fee-based 
product with the moderating effect of product category 
3.6.3. Discussion 
The results validate Study 1 findings with a different product category and a broader sample. 
Compared to a forced switch, a freemium switch has less detrimental effects on fairness percep-
tions and attitude toward the company. At the same time, it exerts a direct negative effect on 
purchase intentions for the fee-based product, while the indirect effect via fairness perceptions 
and attitude toward the company is positive, confirming a competitive mediation effect.  
Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that a forced free-to-fee switch is superior to a freemium switch 
when it comes to eliciting immediate intentions to pay the newly introduced fee. However, at the 
same time, the forced switch results in negative consequences in the form of lower fairness per-
ceptions and less favorable attitude toward the company, which could lead to a long-term dam-
age to company’s reputation. In contrast, the freemium switch leads to more favorable fairness 
perceptions and attitude, but at a cost of lower purchase intentions due to the cannibalization 
caused by the free version.  
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However, as evidenced by companies such as Dropbox or Spotify, which have been applying a 
freemium business model successfully, forcing customers to pay is not always the favored option, 
especially in competitive markets where customers can easily switch providers or choose other 
free alternatives. In such situations, freemium can serve as a powerful marketing tool, lowering 
the required costs of advertising. It is thus not surprising that it has become a dominant business 
model for small companies, such as app developers and Internet start-ups with limited resources 
(Kumar 2014). When a decision is made to switch from free to fee by using a freemium business 
model, the question arises as to how companies can minimize the extent of cannibalization 
caused by the free version. 
3.7. Enhancing fairness in free-to-fee-switches: feature reduction effects 
If a free alternative that is offered in a freemium switch is too similar to the fee-based product, 
customers are more likely to use the free version instead of the fee-based product. Thus, canni-
balization effects are likely to occur (Haruvy and Prasad 2001). However, the less features the 
free version offers relative to the fee-based full version, the less useful it will be, consequently 
leading to lower intentions to use it. Thus, cannibalization of the fee-based product should be 
reduced. In line with this reasoning, Haruvy and Prasad (2001) recommend that companies im-
plementing a freemium business model consider introducing a free version with a sufficiently 
lower quality to avoid cannibalization effects on the fee-based product. Therefore, as the level of 
features offered in the free reduced version of the product decreases, customers’ intentions to 
purchase the fee-based product should increase: 
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H4: The fewer features a free product version in an unexpected freemium free-to-fee switch 
contains, (a) the lower the customers’ usage intention of the free version, and (b) the high-
er the intention to purchase the fee-based product. 
At the same time, based on equity theory, a reduction in product features, and thus, product func-
tionality, should decrease the customers’ output, subsequently reducing the perceived output-
input ratio for consumers. Consistent with equity theory and the fair outcome effect, the lower 
output-input ratio in the case of a strong feature reduction should reduce perceived outcome fair-
ness (Adams 1965), indirectly leading to a less favorable attitude toward the company and lower 
purchase intentions for the fee-based product (van den Bos et al. 1997). Thus:  
H5:  The fewer features a free product version in an unexpected freemium free-to-fee switch 
contains, (a) the lower the fairness perceptions, (b) the less favorable the attitude toward 
the company, and (c) the lower the intention to purchase the fee-based product. 
In sum, we expect that a decreasing level of features of the free version leads to competitive me-
diation, with a feature reduction of the free version directly increasing the intention to purchase 
the fee-based version, while the deterioration in fairness perceptions indirectly decreasing pur-
chase intentions. 
3.8. Study 3 
3.8.1. Method 
To test hypotheses 4 and 5, a between-subjects online experiment with one manipulated factor 
(features of the free product version in a freemium model: high vs. medium vs. low) was con-
ducted. Additionally, a forced switch condition served as a control group. Analyzable data were 
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obtained from 394 undergraduate students (Mage = 21.4 years, SD = 1.94; 45.7% female) who 
completed the survey for extra class credit. All participants were shown detailed information 
about the same photo editor app as in Study 2. We used a manipulation based on the freemium 
condition from Study 2. The three experimental groups only differed in the level of available 
features for the free version. The forced condition was identical to Study 2 (see Appendix E 
(VII)). The dependent variables and covariates were assessed as in previous studies (see Appen-
dix C). In addition, we measured perceived usefulness of the free product version (single item) 
as well as intention to use the free version (Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990; α = .97). 
To create meaningful experimental stimuli of the different levels of feature reduction, we con-
ducted a pretest with 164 undergraduate students (Mage = 22.6 years, SD = 2.10; 41.6% female), 
in which we changed the features of the photo editor app used in Study 2 (e.g., available filters). 
The results confirmed that perceived usefulness of the free version of the app decreased as fewer 
features were available (Mhigh features = 4.38, SE = 1.89; Mmedium features = 3.69, SE = 1.73; Mlow 
features = 1.90, SE = 1.15; all means different at p < .05). 
3.8.2. Results 
In the main Study, a manipulation check confirmed that the perceived usefulness of the reduced 
version decreased with the decreasing feature level (Mhigh features = 4.53, SE = 1.40; Mmedium features 
= 4.16; Mlow features = 2.88, SE = 1.77; all means different at p < .05).  
Testing H4 and H5, an ANCOVA revealed significant effects of feature availability on usage 
intentions of the free product (F(1, 301) = 14.67, p < .01) and purchase intentions of the fee-
based product (F(1, 301) =4.45, p < .01). As illustrated in Figure 22a, the lower the features of 
the free version, the lower the intentions to use it (Mhigh features = 3.60, SE = 1.82; Mmedium features = 
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2.88, SE = 1.63; Mlow features = 2.30, SE = 1.59; all means different at p < .05). For purchase inten-
tions of the fee-based product, the results were mixed. As expected, compared to the medium 
feature level in the free version, the high level of features led to lower purchase intentions for the 
fee-based product (Mmedium features = 1.85, SE = .93; t(192) = 2.20 vs. Mhigh features = 1.60, SE = .71, 
p < .05). Contrary to our expectations, the low feature level of the free version also led to lower 
purchase intentions of the fee-based product compared to the medium feature level (Mlow features = 
1.54, SE = .64; Mmedium features = 1.85, SE = .93; t(205) = 2.86, p < .01). Thus, H4b is only partly 
supported, as the results indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between the feature level of 
the free product and purchase intentions of the fee-based version.  
Further, as shown in Figure 22b, the level of features had a significant effect on fairness percep-
tions (F(1,301) = 6.35, p < .01). The low feature level of the free version led to lower fairness 
perceptions (Mlow features = 3.25, SE = 1.09) compared to the medium (vs. Mmedium features = 3.72, 
SE = 1.08; t(209) = 2.97, p < .01) and high feature levels (vs. Mhigh features = 3.71, SE = 1.06; 
t(217) = 3.03, p < .01). No significant differences in fairness perceptions existed between the 
medium and high feature levels (t(198) = .03, n.s.). The effect of level of features on attitude 
toward the company was also significant (F(1, 301) = 18.05, p < .01), indicating a lower attitude 
for the low feature level of the free version (Mlow features = 3.36, SE = 1.06) compared to the medi-
um (vs. Mmedium features = 3.85, SE = .84; t(209) = 3.67, p < .01) and high levels (vs. Mhigh features = 
4.09, SE = .81; t(217) = 5.67, p < .01), while the medium feature level also led to less favorable 
attitude compared to the high level (t(198) = 2.03, p < .05). 
A comparison with the control group (a forced switch) indicated that, consistent with Studies 1 
and 2, purchase intentions for the fee-based product were significantly lower in all three freemi-
um conditions compared to the forced condition (Mforced = 2.54, SE = 1.32, all means different at 
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p < .01). However, the freemium condition with low features in the free version revealed no sig-
nificant differences in fairness perceptions compared to the forced switch (Mlow features = 3.27, SE 
= 1.06 vs. Mforced = 3.25, SE = .94; t(192) = .16, n.s.), while attitude toward the company was 
even less positive in the low feature freemium condition (Mlow features = 3.36, SE = 1.06 vs. Mforced 
= 3.77, SE = .90; t(192) = 2.72, p < .01) (see Figure 22b). 
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(A) Usage intention and purchase intention 
 
 
 
(B) Fairness perception and attitude toward the company 
 
 
Figure 22: Paper 2 - Study 3: Comparison of means (high vs. medium vs. low features of the free version 
in a freemium switch) with forced switch as control group 
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3.8.3. Discussion 
Study 3 shows that both high and low feature levels of the free version in a freemium switch lead 
to lower purchase intentions for the fee-based product than a medium level of features. Examina-
tion of the theoretical mechanism behind these effects indicates that the negative effect of the 
high feature level is due to an increased cannibalization stemming from high usage intention of 
the free version, while the negative effect of the low feature level can be explained by a sharp 
decrease in customers’ fairness perceptions.  
Interestingly, high and medium levels of features in the free product version are perceived as 
equally fair, while a medium feature level directly leads to higher purchase intention of the fee-
based product due to lower cannibalization. A low feature level is perceived as less fair, which 
negatively affects purchase intentions. In this case, perceived unfairness prevails, while in the 
case of a high feature level, cannibalization wins out. Thus, the level of features of the free ver-
sion in the freemium switch determines which mechanism is dominant, product cannibalization 
or perception of unfairness. Combined, these findings suggest that a medium level of features 
provides an optimal balance between the two effects, leading to most favorable customer re-
sponses among freemium conditions overall, with no reduction in perceived fairness and an in-
crease in purchase intentions for the fee-based product relative to both low and high feature lev-
els.  
The results show than an attempt to enhance purchase intentions of the fee-based product by 
offering a free product version with greatly reduced features, as suggested by Haruvy and Prasad 
(2001), can backfire, as customers may perceive it as an unfair offer. Moreover, a greatly re-
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duced free version leads to an even less favorable attitude toward the company than a forced 
switch.  
3.9. Enhancing fairness in free-to-fee-switches: justification effects 
Focusing on the freemium free-to-fee switch option, Study 3 examined the effects of changing 
the output by considering the level of feature reduction of the free version. Compared to a free-
mium switch, however, a forced free-to-fee switch does not allow for variation in different out-
put alternatives. Instead, a forced switch is similar to a price increase in that it requires an in-
crease in customer sacrifice (input), while the output (product features) remains the same. Thus, 
an alternative way to enhance fairness perceptions in a forced switch needs to be identified. We 
propose that in a forced free-to-fee switch, companies can influence the procedural aspects of the 
switch in order to enhance the perceived fairness.  
When forming fairness perceptions, customers may not only consider the outcome, but also the 
procedure that leads to the outcome (e.g., Collie et al. 2002; Tarrahi et al. 2016). Procedural jus-
tice pertains to a judgment of whether a process is based on prevailing norms or behaviors (Thi-
baut and Walker 1975). For instance, a price increase that results from an increased cost of the 
material may be judged as more acceptable based on the prevailing norms than one that is a re-
sult of increased marketing costs (Bolton et al. 2003).   
Research on price increases suggests several approaches to enhance fairness perception based on 
the principles of procedural justice, including providing an understandable and credible justifica-
tion (e.g., Kachelmeier et al.1991; Martin et al. 2009) or inducing customers to infer a positive 
seller’s motive for the price increase (e.g., Campbell 1999a; Campbell 1999 b).  
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Integrating extant price fairness research and extending it to the free-to-fee switching context, we 
adopt the procedural justice concept of offering a justification for a price increase in order to 
enhance customers’ fairness perceptions of the free-to-fee switch. In addition, when consumers 
face an unexpected price, as, in our case, a newly introduces price, receiving an explanation 
should increase their feelings of control over the situation and allow them to adapt to the change 
more easily (Folkes 1990). Thus, we propose that providing a justification for the switch will 
enhance fairness perceptions. Moreover, as proposed by the fair process effect (Collie et al. 
2002), perceived procedural fairness of the switching process should consequently drive behav-
ioral responses to the outcome itself. In sum, we predict:  
H6:  The presence of a justification (vs. no justification) for a free-to-fee switch leads to (a) 
higher fairness perceptions, (b) more favorable attitude toward the company, and (c) high-
er purchase intentions for the fee-based product. 
3.10. Study 4 
3.10.1. Method 
To test hypothesis 6, a between-subjects online experiment with two manipulated factors 
(switching option: a forced vs. a freemium switch and justification: yes vs. no) was conducted. 
The justification stated that the company had to introduce a price due to higher product devel-
opment cost. This justification was selected because product costs were found to be an accepta-
ble basis for charging a higher price (e.g., Bolton et al. 2003; Kahneman et al. 1986). The ana-
lyzable sample consisted of 182 participants (Mage = 32.6, SD = 9.10, 40.1% female), who were 
recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and completed the questionnaire for an incentive of 
US$0.50. All participants were shown detailed information about a photo editor app, identical to 
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Studies 2 and 3. The dependent variables and potential covariates were identical to those in prior 
studies.  
3.10.2. Results 
ANCOVA results indicated that the effects of justification on fairness perceptions (F(1, 176) = 
10.57, p < .01) and attitude toward the company (F(1, 176) = 5.71, p < .05) were significant and 
positive, as proposed in H6a-b. However, the effect on purchase intentions was not significant 
(F(1, 176) = .09, n.s.) leading to a rejection of H6c. Providing a justification for the switch led to 
greater fairness perceptions (Mno justifcation= 3.11, SE = 1.81 vs. Mjustification = 3.93, SE = 1.87; 
t(180) = 2.95, p < .01) and more favorable attitude toward the company (Mno justifcation= 3.27, SE 
= 1.66 vs. Mjustification = 3.78, SE = 1.72; t(180) = 2.03, p < .05), but did not increase purchase 
intentions of the fee-based product (Mno justifcation= 2.09, SE = 1.34 vs. Mjustification = 2.01, SE = 
1.30; t(180) = .40, n.s.), see Figure 23.  
 
Figure 23: Paper 2 - Study 4: Significant mean differences (no justification vs. justification) 
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Moreover, no interaction effect between justification and the type of switch was evident, which 
demonstrates that providing a justification for the switch is equally effective in addressing fair-
ness perceptions and attitude toward the company across both switching options. Examining the 
mediation process, justification indirectly affected attitude toward the company via fairness per-
ception (B = .55, SE = .19, 99% bootstrap CI: .069 to .05), but had no indirect effect on pur-
chase intentions via fairness and attitude toward the company (B = .03, SE = .06, 90% bootstrap 
CI: .139 to .052).   
3.10.3. Discussion 
Study 4 reveals that providing a justification for the switch reduces negative effects of an unex-
pected free-to-fee switch on perceived fairness and attitude toward the company for both forced 
and freemium switches. However, providing a justification does not increase purchase intentions 
of the fee-based product. Thus, the disadvantages of a forced switch – lower perceived fairness 
and less favorable attitudes toward the company – can be addressed by providing a justification 
for the switch, while the disadvantage of a freemium switch – lower purchase intentions of the 
fee-based product – cannot be improved. The non-significant interaction between the presence of 
a justification and the type of switch is not surprising, as all companies are likely to incur product 
development costs, regardless of the type of switch they decide to implement, making the justifi-
cation based on the product development cost equally effective across the two switches.  
3.11. General discussion 
This research provides important theoretical contributions and managerial implications by bridg-
ing the gap between research on freemium business models and price introductions. Utilizing 
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different samples (students, general population through a market research company, and M-Turk 
participants) and different experimental designs (longitudinal, cross-sectional) across four studies, 
we investigated customers’ responses to unexpected free-to-fee switches and different ways of 
attenuating their negative consequences. Our findings suggest that there is a conflict between the 
goal of maximizing purchase intentions for the fee-based product and minimizing negative cus-
tomers’ reactions, such as perceived unfairness and deteriorated attitudes toward the company. 
The results of Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that unexpected free-to-fee switches negatively 
affect customers’ fairness perceptions, attitude, and purchase intention for both utilitarian and 
hedonic products. Moreover, compared to a forced switch, providing customers with an option to 
keep using a functionally reduced version of the product for free can attenuate negative conse-
quences of the switch on perceived fairness and attitude toward the company. At the same time, 
however, this option reduces purchase intentions for the fee-based product, as more customers 
opt for using the free version.  
Building upon these results, Study 3 focuses on identifying how to increase purchase intentions 
for the fee-based-product in a freemium switch. The findings suggest that offering a free version 
which is greatly reduced in functionality may be unwise, as it does not increase the intention to 
purchase the fee-based product, but rather indirectly reduces intentions due to lower fairness 
perceptions. A free version with a medium feature level presents an optimal balance between 
enhancing purchase intentions of the fee-based product, while maintaining fairness perceptions.  
Lastly, Study 4 demonstrates that the disadvantages of a forced switch (i.e., lower fairness per-
ceptions and less favorable attitude toward the company) can be reduced by providing a justifica-
tion for the switch. Providing a rationale for the fee increases perceived fairness and, subsequent-
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ly, attitude toward the company in a forced and in a freemium switch, but does not affect inten-
tions to pay the introduced fee. 
3.11.1. Contributions to theory 
The results of our research contribute to behavioral pricing theory by integrating concepts of 
product cannibalization and price fairness. Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that the restriction 
of choice in a forced switch leads to a decline in customers’ fairness perceptions and attitudes; 
however, it also provides an opportunity to avoid negative cannibalization effects. In combining 
price fairness and product cannibalization perspectives and applying them to the context of free-
to-fee switches, the research sheds light on the complex psychological mechanism of customers’ 
reactions to different types of unexpected free-to-fee switches. This provides an explanation for 
the finding by Arora et al. (2017) that the availability of a free version cannibalizes the fee-based 
product. Study 3 demonstrates the delicate balance between the two theoretical mechanisms in a 
freemium switch. The nature of the prevailing mechanism is found to depend on the feature level 
of the free version. At a high feature level, the mechanism based on cannibalization prevails, 
while at a low feature level, the mechanism based on perceived fairness wins out. A medium 
feature level proves to have the best balance between the two effects, leading to the least nega-
tive responses.    
Also in Study 3, a boundary condition for the assumption that offering a choice has positive ef-
fects (Brehm and Brehm 1981) is identified, as a free option with severely reduced features leads 
to more negative effects even when compared to having no choice in a forced switch, because of 
lower fairness perceptions. By identifying this boundary condition, we add to Haruvy and Pra-
sad’s (2001) research on the level of feature reduction in freemium business models. While they 
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investigate how many features could be added before cannibalization effects arise, we focus on 
the extent of features that can be removed before negative effects on fairness and attitude emerge. 
Our research findings suggest that introducing a free version with sufficiently lower quality to 
avoid cannibalization of the fee-based product, as advised by Haruvy and Prasad (2001), may 
actually backfire, as consumers perceive a version with heavily reduced features to be unfair.   
Additionally, Study 4 contributes to the literature on the fair process effect (Collie et al. 2002) by 
demonstrating that perceived fairness of both forced and freemium free-to-fee switches can be 
increased by offering a justification for the switch, similar as in the case of a price increase.     
3.11.2. Managerial implications 
Our findings offers important managerial implications for companies interested in future imple-
mentation of free-to-fee switches (e.g., app and software developers, online content providers, 
etc.) as well as companies which have already experienced negative reactions after a free-to-fee 
switch. The results highlight the importance of considering the negative consequences of an un-
expected switch on customers’ fairness perceptions, attitude toward the company, and purchase 
intentions. A forced switch is superior to a freemium switch with regard to purchase intentions, 
as the latter option cannibalizes purchase intentions for the fee-based product. If the firm’s key 
intention is to boost purchase intentions for the fee-based product, a forced switch is recom-
mended. Thus, companies that have a strong focus on short-term sales should consider using the 
forced switch to maximize their sales. 
However, although a forced switch results in greater short-term intentions to purchase the fee-
based product, it does lead to deteriorated attitude, which could have damaging long-term conse-
quences for the company and its reputation. Thus, a freemium switch is recommended as a safer 
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switching option for companies that do not want to compromise customers’ attitude. Smaller 
start-up companies, in particular, may be better off implementing a freemium switch and utiliz-
ing the free reduced product version as a marketing tool to increase awareness. This may be par-
ticularly appropriate for companies with limited advertising budgets. A freemium model could 
also be a promising way to establish or strengthen customer relationships by staying in contact 
with users who do not want to buy the product immediately.  
Study 3 highlights the importance of considering the feature level of the free product version in 
the freemium switch. The strategy of minimizing unfavorable cannibalization effects of the free 
version on sales of the fee-based product by offering a free version with highly functionally re-
duced features can backfire due to inducing strong feelings of unfairness. In this case, instead of 
offering a highly reduced free version, companies should choose an average functionality. This, 
in turn, should lead to more favorable attitude toward the company and, indirectly, higher inten-
tions to buy the fee-based product.  
Lastly, for companies that have decided to implement a forced free-to-fee switch, it is important 
to carefully consider ways in which customers’ attitude could be improved, such as by offering a 
compelling rationale for the new fee. Study 4 demonstrates that providing an appropriate justifi-
cation for the switch can lead to positive effects. Receiving an explanation for the switch in-
creases customers’ fairness perception, and consequently enhances their attitude toward the 
company. Even though there is no immediate impact on purchase intentions, the more positive 
perceptions and attitude should lead to a stronger relationship between the customer and the firm, 
providing more long-term benefits. Further, justification should be provided regardless of the 
type of switch, as its positive effects are present in both forced and freemium switches.  
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3.11.3. Limitations and future research 
Certain limitations should be considered when interpreting the results of this research. Since the 
Study context was limited to mobile apps at a medium price level, different product categories 
and price levels should be considered in the future. The results are also restricted by the scenario-
based nature of the experiments. While respondents rated experimental realism as high, a field 
setting in which participants actually use a product or service over a specific time period should 
be employed in future research. Future studies should also consider long-term effects of free-to-
fee switches. Further, even though our research included three different populations and the re-
sults remained remarkably consistent across the samples, other customer populations should be 
studied in the future.  
Another strategy for introducing a fee, but one not investigated in this research, is providing a 
premium version of the product offering additional value or attributes that can be used to justify 
the fee (Anderson 2009; Witell and Löfgren 2013). In this case, a premium product version is 
introduced for a fee, while the original free version remains free. While a price introduction for a 
premium product is not directly considered to be a free-to-fee switch, it could provide an alterna-
tive strategy that may be able to combat negative consequences associated with free-to-fee 
switches, and should thus be studied in the future. 
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4. Paper 3: To Be Continued… - Effects of Interrupted Previews on Emo-
tional Responses and Purchase Decisions 
4.1. Abstract 
In many industries gets more and more difficult to earn money with digital content (e.g., online 
journalism). Therefore, previews are essential to sell products or services online by providing a 
teasers for paid content (e.g., such as online articles). Some companies offer complete content 
previews; others seek to increase consumption by interrupting the previews they provide. The 
Zeigarnik effect postulates that an interrupted activity creates unresolved arousal, resulting in 
greater recall and desire for completion. Consumers’ need for cognitive closure (NFCC) should 
intensify such outcomes. Four experimental studies, including measures of galvanic skin re-
sponses and incentive-aligned designs, reveal that interrupted previews enhance arousal, espe-
cially as consumers’ NFCC increases. However, this increased emotional reaction translates into 
fewer, not greater, purchases of the paid content, because consumers feel betrayed when the de-
mand for payment prevents them from satisfying their NFCC. In contrast, for freely accessible 
content, this higher arousal overcomes negative reactions to interrupted previews and increases 
content consumption. This study reveals the emotional mechanisms underlying the negative con-
sequences of the Zeigarnik effect for consumer behavior, especially among consumers with a 
high NFCC, who exhibit stronger negative reactions to interruptions when they cannot satisfy 
their desire to finish the activity without making some sacrifice. The findings thus call into ques-
tion some of the managerial practices around content previews and provide actionable insights 
for companies. 
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Additional note:  
 This paper was submitted to the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR), VHB3 Ranking: 
A+, and invited to be revised and resubmitted. 
 Parts of this paper were presented at:  
» the Academy of Marketing Science (AMS) Annual Conference, Lake Buena Vista, 
USA, May 2016; 
» the Winter Marketing Educators’ Conference (AMA), Las Vegas, USA, Feb., 
2016 (Working Paper). 
 
 A prior version of this paper coauthored with JProf. Dr. Tobias Schäfers (TU Dortmund 
University) and Ann-Kristin Kupfer (Muenster University): 
Cziehso, G. P., Schaefers, T., Kupfer, A.: „To Be Continued… - Effects of Interrupted 
Previews on Emotional Responses and Purchase Decisions”. 
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4.2. Introduction 
Waiters were observed to remember details from unpaid orders much better than 
those from orders that had already been paid. It appears that their ability to re-
member the information decreased right after they had completed the task. This 
unsystematic observation of Prof. Lewin in 1927 encouraged Bljuma Zeigarnik to 
investigate that phenomenon systematically (Zeigarnik 1938). But even decades 
after she found out that people remember uncompleted tasks better than …                                   
[Please subscribe to read the full article!] 
In digital contexts, text-based online previews such as this one are common, used to attract con-
sumers to commercial websites. Online newspapers, e-books, and scientific journals all seek to 
catch potential customers’ attention to their paid content by using previews, teasers, or abstracts. 
These “product samples” might feature a comprehensive preview, such that consumers are able 
to finish reading the last sentence, or use interruptions, such as in the opening example, that cut 
off the preview before the last sentence. Content providers appear uncertain about the advantages 
of each approach, so we find examples of both forms in real-world practice, even within the 
same content providers (see Appendix F).  
Theoretically, interrupting a task may lead to different emotional and behavioral reactions, ac-
cording to what scholars call the Zeigarnik effect. Zeigarnik (1938) argues that an interruption 
creates a feeling of unresolved arousal, which enhances memory by making the information 
available until the task is completed (see also Boguslavsky and Guthrie 1941; Prentice 1944). A 
well-accepted consequence of this effect is stronger recall of interrupted activities and uncom-
pleted tasks (e.g., Baddeley 2008; Green 1963; Marrow 1938; Martin and Davidson 1964). The 
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Zeigarnik effect remains of interest for scholars, who have shown that interruptions can result in 
greater attention to advertising messages (Hammadi and Qureishi 2013), enhanced evaluations of 
consumption experiences (Nelson and Meyvis 2008; Nelson et al. 2009), and choices of desira-
ble rather than feasible products (Liu 2008). Beyond these general effects though, Kruglanski 
(1989) also notes that consumers differ in their individual reactions to interruptions, due to their 
unique needs for cognitive closure (NFCC). This stable individual characteristic refers to a per-
son’s psychological requirement to find an answer to an ambiguous situation, including finishing 
an incomplete task (Kruglanski et al. 1997; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). Niculescu et al. 
(2013) combine interruptions with NFCC to investigate interrupted anagrams and their effects on 
unrelated product evaluations; Kardes et al. (2007) also show that the positive effects of disrupt-
ed messages on consumers’ willingness to pay are stronger for those with high NFCC. However, 
most investigations of the Zeigarnik effect consider NFCC as a situational, rather than an indi-
vidual difference, variable (e.g., Chirumbolo et al. 2004; Heaton and Kruglanski 1991) or mainly 
seek to show that an interruption leads to an increased desire for cognitive closure (Kupor et al. 
2015).  
In turn, the majority of psychological and consumer behavior studies point to positive effects of 
interruptions, such as increased recall (Baddeley 2008), attention (Hammadi and Qureishi 2013), 
willingness to pay (Kardes et al. 2007), or persuasion effects (Kupor and Tormala 2015). Little is 
known about the negative effects of uncompleted tasks on consumer behavior, with a few nota-
ble exceptions. That is, Xia and Sudharshan (2002) show that different interruption characteris-
tics lead to less satisfaction with the decision process, and Nelson et al. (2009) find that interrup-
tions can worsen negative consumption experiences. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no re-
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search addresses the negative behavioral consequences of interruptions in consumption deci-
sions.  
This gap is especially striking in light of research in other fields that highlights the negative ef-
fects of interruptions, including medical and pharmaceutical research (e.g., Drews 2007; Flynn et 
al. 1999), flight safety (Latorella 1996), and other work-related behaviors (e.g., Jett and George 
2003; Zijlstra et al. 1999). As Zeigarnik (1938, p. 20) herself observed, her experimental “partic-
ipants defend against an interruption. Some participants defended so badly that they refuse to 
hand in their unfinished drawing tasks, even if the examiner urgently requires it. The participants 
got into a state of affective behavior.” Thus, not all interruptions lead to positive effects, espe-
cially if consumers cannot complete a consumption task without facing some closure hindrance 
(e.g., required payment). This research accordingly investigates whether the Zeigarnik effect 
applies to the consumption context of strategically interrupted previews, to determine whether 
this approach results in higher arousal and increased purchases or instead may backfire and cause 
consumers to feel betrayed and unwilling to purchase.  
We examine consumers’ reactions to text-based interrupted previews and the underlying psycho-
logical process using multiple methods in four studies, including a skin response experiment and 
an incentive-aligned experiment. The resulting findings contribute to established literature in 
three main ways. First, we show that an interrupted preview of online content leads to greater 
levels of arousal, in support of the relevance of the Zeigarnik effect for consumer research. This 
arousal results in negative behavioral responses, in terms of purchases, which are mediated by 
betrayal as a negative emotion, as we show for the first time. Second, we link the Zeigarnik ef-
fect to individual NFCC and provide empirical evidence of the moderating effect of consumers’ 
NFCC. Both the positive effect of an interrupted preview on arousal and its negative effect on 
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purchases increase in magnitude with greater individual NFCC. These findings stress the im-
portance of accounting for NFCC by revealing that consumer resistance to closure hindrance 
causes those high in NFCC to refrain from purchasing, but it does not affect those low in NFCC. 
Third, we demonstrate that the negative emotional reactions to preview interruptions are due to 
closure hindrance (i.e., payment barrier); they reverse if this hindrance is removed. Thus, when 
consumers can satisfy their NFCC immediately, without payment, interruptions prompt positive 
behavioral outcomes (i.e., higher click rates and content consumption). These theoretical insights 
in turn establish clear recommendations for managers who are designing preview strategies for 
the paid and free online content they seek to market. 
4.3. Conceptual model 
4.3.1. Effects of preview interruptions on purchase behaviour 
An interruption represents an externally generated disruption of ongoing activity (Coraggio 
1990). In our study context, an interrupted preview offers a teaser for a text-based product or 
service that gets cut off in the middle of a sentence, making it impossible for consumers to finish 
reading. A concluded preview instead refers to a self-contained teaser that can be read in its en-
tirety; consumers may finish reading the last sentence without being interrupted. Both concluded 
and interrupted previews give consumers only a brief idea of the full content though, such that 
they offer similar amounts of information for a yet-to-be-consumed product or service. They also 
have a similar aim, namely, to exploit the effects of an unfulfilled goal and enhance consumers’ 
desire to consume the full content. According to Zeigarnik (1938), an interrupted preview, com-
pared with a concluded one, should result in different emotional responses, because the initial 
goal of finishing the preview remains incomplete. Task interruptions create emotional arousal, 
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which would be absent for consumers who have completed the initial task of reading the entire 
preview (Zeigarnik 1938). This increase in arousal due to task interruption has been well sup-
ported in psychology studies (e.g., Worchel and Arnold 1974). Accordingly, we expect the Zei-
garnik effect to arise in the setting of interrupted previews of online content. Formally,  
H1:  An interrupted preview leads to higher levels of arousal than a concluded preview. 
Increased arousal due to interrupted activity also should increase consumers’ desire to finish the 
interrupted task. Previous research reveals a general human desire to complete ongoing activities 
rather than leaving them unfinished (e.g., Kruglanski and Webster 1996). In their investigations, 
Kupor et al. (2015) and Kupor and Tormala (2015) also show that interruptions lead to closure-
seeking behavior. As such, the interruption-initiated arousal seemingly could lead to an increase 
in purchases, an intended outcome that drives the practices of content providers in reality, such 
as the Wall Street Journal. 
However, in this context, consumers also confront a demand for a required payment that prevents 
them from completing the unfinished task without some monetary sacrifice. In contrast with a 
situation in which the task interruption naturally gets resolved after some period of time (e.g., 
Kardes et al. 2007), this payment acts as a “closure hindrance” that might trigger negative emo-
tional responses, because the offering of an interrupted preview in a paid context might lead con-
sumers to question the content provider’s practices. According to Grégoire and Fisher (2008, p. 
250), consumers react with a feeling of betrayal when they “believe that a firm has intentionally 
violated what is normative” by taking advantage of them, tricking them, or trying to exploit them 
(Elangovan and Shapiro 1998). An interrupted preview might be perceived as an attempt to take 
advantage of consumers’ NFCC, by deliberately creating greater arousal that cannot be resolved 
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without an (unpleasant) payment. According to Holloway et al. (2009), feelings of betrayal even 
can lead consumers to “recast” their relationship with the company, with detrimental behavioral 
consequences (e.g., fewer purchases). A negative emotional response to payment-induced clo-
sure hindrance also is consistent with Zeigarnik’s (1938) assertion that an abrupt interruption, 
without the possibility of finishing the task, provokes negative emotions and behavioral conse-
quences. Thus, we expect negative emotions to dominate when a closure hindrance exists and 
requires consumers to make sacrifices to satisfy their NFCC.  
H2:  When closure hindrance exists, an interrupted preview leads to fewer purchases than a 
concluded preview, because increased arousal leads to higher perceived betrayal. With-
out closure hindrance, no such negative emotional reactions arise. 
4.3.2. Moderating effect of consumers’ need for cognitive closure 
Although intrapersonal differences in NFCC may reflect situational variables (Heaton and 
Kruglanski 1991), NFCC also is a stable personal trait (Houghton and Grewal 2000; Kruglanski 
1989) that comprises five dimensions: (1) desire for predictability, (2) preference for order and 
structure, (3) discomfort with ambiguity, (4) decisiveness, and (5) close-mindedness (Webster 
and Kruglanski 1994). An urgent desire to reach cognitive closure and strong tendency to seek 
conclusions, as reflected in the decisiveness dimension (Kruglanski et al. 1993), should be highly 
pertinent to interruptions and reactions to them. That is, consumers who experience an interrupt-
ed preview might react differently, depending on their score on the decisiveness dimension of 
NFCC. If they exhibit strong decisiveness and thus high NFCC, consumers likely experience 
stronger psychological arousal after being interrupted, due to their great sensitivity to unfinished 
tasks. Kruglanski and Webster (1996) show that individuals with high NFCC experience the 
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absence of cognitive closure as more unpleasant than those low in NFCC, which should lead to 
stronger emotional reactions. Thus, we postulate that consumers high in NFCC experience 
stronger arousal when exposed to an interrupted preview than do consumers low in NFCC. 
Moreover, Kruglanski and Webster (1996) describe two tendencies that are common to high 
NFCC individuals: urgency and permanence. An urgency tendency leads people to seek to 
achieve cognitive closure as quickly as possible, because their need to find a conclusion is more 
urgent than it is for those low in NFCC. The permanence tendency instead reflects their desire to 
perpetuate this sense of cognitive closure. However, reaching cognitive closure faster (urgency) 
and trying to protect it in the future (permanence) both are unreachable in the case of an inter-
rupted preview, unless consumers make an unpleasant sacrifice (i.e., spend money). Consequent-
ly, consumers high in NFCC should exhibit not only a greater level of arousal but also stronger 
negative emotions when they are unable to satisfy their enhanced NFCC without hindrance. Be-
cause they must sacrifice money to complete their task, consumers high in NFCC who confront 
an interrupted preview for paid content should express higher levels of emotional arousal (vs. 
consumers low in NFCC), leading to stronger feelings of betrayal, which in turn should negative-
ly affect their purchase decision. Thus, completing our conceptual model illustrated in Figure 24, 
we hypothesize that: 
H3:  Need for cognitive closure moderates the effects of an interrupted (vs. concluded) pre-
view, such that as NFCC increases, (a) the positive influence on arousal and (b) the neg-
ative influence on purchases increase. 
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Figure 24: Paper 3 - Conceptual model 
4.4. Overview of studies 
We test our hypotheses using four experimental studies. Study 1 uses galvanic skin response 
measures to show that interrupted previews increase arousal (hypothesis 1) and provide initial 
empirical support for the moderating role of NFCC (hypothesis 3). With an incentive-aligned 
experiment, Study 2 reveals a negative effect of interrupted previews on purchases (hypothesis 2), 
again moderated by NFCC (hypothesis 3). Then in Study 3, we integrate these findings in a 
comprehensive model that explains the negative effect on purchases by including betrayal as an 
additional mediator (hypothesis 2). Studies 1–3 focus on situations marked by a closure hin-
drance (i.e., required payment), whereas Study 4 provides a comprehensive test of hypothesis 2 
by manipulating its existence (i.e., free vs. paid content). We thus can show that the negative 
effects of an interruption are attributable to the payment required to consume the content. Study 
4 also affirms the robustness of our findings, by featuring a different product type (i.e., hedonic 
instead of utilitarian).  
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4.5. Study 1 
In Study 1, we apply physiological observations obtained from galvanic skin responses (GSR) as 
valid measures of arousal. This method measures changes in the electrical conductivity of the 
skin caused by moisture on the skin’s surface (Dawson et al. 2011), so it provides an indication 
of arousal, in that the sweat glands are controlled by the sympathetic nervous system, which re-
acts to environmental stimuli (Critchley 2002). When the sympathetic branch of the nervous 
system is aroused, sweat gland activity increases and accordingly increases skin conductance, as 
measured by GSR. Thus, skin conductance recording is a valid method for investigating con-
sumers’ physiological reactions to stimuli (Critchley 2002).  
4.5.1. Research method 
We recorded participants’ skin conductance responses (GSR) when they confronted an interrupt-
ed or a concluded preview. The 51 participants were graduate students (Mage = 25.0 years, SD = 
4.47, 58.8% female), invited to a behavioral lab to complete a voluntary study. They were in-
formed that their physiological responses to different tasks would be measured. Participants were 
seated in front of a computer and began by filling out a short questionnaire that captured demo-
graphic information (e.g., age, gender), covariates (technological anxiety, interest in the article, 
frequency of reading online articles, along with gender, and age), and NFCC (decisiveness di-
mension) (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). The detailed scales, individual items, and coefficient 
alpha values appear in Appendix G. After they completed the questionnaire, we placed a pair of 
silver chloride electrodes on the participants’ left index and middle fingers, where the density of 
sweat glands is greatest (Dawson et al. 2011). Subsequently, they completed a filler task (maze 
labyrinth) and were assigned randomly to one of the experimental conditions (concluded vs. in-
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terrupted preview) or else a control group. Participants assigned to the experimental conditions 
read a short, text-based preview of a newspaper article (88 words, see Appendix H); those in the 
control group saw a typical Zeigarnik task in which they were interrupted after 20 seconds of 
trying to solve another maze. The previewed news article described the job market outlook in the 
participants’ field of study (business), such that it was of interest to the respondents, as con-
firmed by an “interest in the article” measure with four items (7-point agreement scale, α = .84; 
M = 4.61, SD = 1.12; see Appendix G; Mathwick and Rigdon 2004). After reading the preview, 
these participants read that they would have to pay €0.50 to be able to complete the full article. 
The two experimental groups differed only in the preview type; in the concluded preview condi-
tion, the last sentence of the text-based preview was completed, rather than being interrupted in 
the midst of an additional last sentence, as follows: “In addition, it has been shown that …” (see 
Appendix H). In a pretest with 58 undergraduate students (Mage = 21.3 years, SD = 2.50; 41.4% 
female), both articles were perceived as equivalent in their information quantity (Minterrupted = 
3.53, SE = .93; Mconcluded = 3.74, SE = .79; t(56) = .95, n.s.) and article quality (Minterrupted = 4.53, 
SE = 1.44; Mconcluded = 4.20, SE = 1.33; t(56) = .91, n.s.), on 7-point Likert scales (1 = low to 7 = 
high).  
We took a 5-second baseline measure at the beginning of the manipulation, while participants 
read the identical beginning of the preview article. We compared this baseline to a 5-second 
window directly after participants finished reading the different preview endings (concluded vs. 
interrupted). The second time window also included the period in which they read the payment 
information. The total average reading time was 27 seconds (min: 21 seconds, max: 64 seconds), 
so overlaps of these two time windows can be excluded. After the experiment, we removed the 
silver chloride electrodes and debriefed the participants.  
 101 
 
4.5.2. Results 
Using skin conductance responses measured by GSR, we identify changes in emotional arousal 
(Dawson et al. 2011) when the amplitude of these changes is greater than .05 microSiemens (μS) 
beyond the baseline (Boucsein 1992). Thus, in addition to conventional significance testing, we 
include .05 μS as a threshold for our hypotheses tests. To account for the within-subjects design, 
we used a mixed-measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with time as a within-subjects 
factor (GSR1 = mean of first 5 seconds of reading preview article vs. GSR2 = mean of first 5 
seconds after reading the preview and payment information) and the two experimental conditions 
as a between-subjects factor. This repeated measures ANCOVA indicates no significant effects 
of the covariates and no main effect of time (i.e., difference between reading the beginning of the 
preview and seeing the different types of preview endings) on GSR (F(1, 28) = 1.98, n.s.). How-
ever, we find differences across the experimental conditions, such that the interaction between 
time and preview endings is significant (F(1, 28) = 7.74, p < .01): The interrupted preview had a 
positive effect on GSR. Participants exhibited stronger physiological reactions in the interrupted 
preview condition (GSR1 = 2.86, SE = 1.15; GSR2 = 3.01, SE = 1.17; t(18) = 2.21, p < .05; 
∆(Means) > .05 μS), but we found no such difference in the concluded preview condition (GSR1 
= 2.87, SE = 1.91; GSR2 = 2.83, SE = 1.86; t(18) = 1.41, n.s. ; ∆(Means) < .05 μS), as illustrated 
in Figure 25, panel a. 
To investigate the moderating effect of NFCC, we conducted a regression with the individual 
delta values of the GSR results (GSR2 – GSR1) as the dependent variable. The independent vari-
ables were preview type, mean-centered NFCC, the preview type × NFCC interaction, and the 
covariates (i.e., interest in the topic of the article, technological anxiety, frequency of reading 
online newspaper articles, age, and gender). This analysis revealed a main effect of preview type 
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on GSR (B = .19, SE = .07, t(32) = 2.57, p < .01) and a significant interaction (B = .12, SE = .06, 
t(32) = 2.11, p < .05), but no significant effects of the covariates. According to a spotlight analy-
sis (Irwin and McClelland 2001), the interrupted preview led to a greater increase in arousal for 
participants with high levels of NFCC (+1 SD) (B = .34, SE = .10, t(32) = 3.28, p < .01). How-
ever, no such effect was evident for respondents with low NFCC (1 SD) (B = .04, SE = .10, 
t(32) = .35, n.s.), as illustrated in Figure 25, panel b. 
a. Repeated measurement results b. Regression results with delta values and 
NFCC as a moderator 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Paper 3 - Study 1: Effect of preview type on galvanic skin response (GSR) 
As robustness checks, we conducted all these analyses with another baseline (first 5 seconds 
after starting the survey, instead of first 5 seconds of reading the preview article) and different 
time windows for both baselines (10 seconds vs. 5 seconds). The results were similar.  
A comparison with the control group showed no significant differences between the interrupted 
preview condition and the control condition of an interruption in solving a maze either (F(1, 25) 
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= 1.67, n.s.). However, the results for the comparison between the concluded preview condition 
and the interrupted maze-control condition revealed the same pattern as those reported for the 
concluded vs. interrupted preview conditions, with significantly higher GSR in the control group 
(F(1, 26) = 3.49, p < .05). 
4.5.3. Discussion 
Consumers react with greater arousal when seeing an interrupted, rather than a concluded, pre-
view, consistent with hypothesis 1. However, this effect only occurs for consumers with high and 
medium levels of NFCC; it is not present for those low in NFCC, in support of hypothesis 3a. 
Furthermore, when we compare the two experimental groups with a control group, the result 
pattern significantly differs from the concluded preview condition but mirrors the findings from 
the interrupted preview condition. Thus, an interrupted preview elicits reactions similar to inter-
rupted tasks, as reported in previous research. We cautiously interpret this observation as empiri-
cal evidence that the effects of interrupted previews are rooted in the Zeigarnik effect.  
4.6. Study 2 
To assess the effect of preview type on actual purchases while integrating a moderating effect of 
NFCC, we conducted an incentive-aligned, between-subjects experiment with one manipulated 
factor (preview type: concluded vs. interrupted). Incentive-aligned studies offer good estimates 
of consumers’ preferences, because they provide a realistic setting for measuring actual purchase 
decisions (Ding et al. 2005). We thus can test the behavioral consequences of the Zeigarnik ef-
fect in an empirical context, when a true sacrifice is required. 
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4.6.1. Research method 
A total of 120 undergraduate students (Mage = 20.8 years, SD = 2.11; 50.8% female) were re-
cruited for a lab experiment, in exchange for extra class credit. Upon entering the computer lab, 
each participant received two vouchers with a value of €0.50 each and learned that the vouchers 
could be used to make purchases during the experiment, whether for fun incentives (chocolate 
bar, lollipop, and pencil) or a newspaper article. Participants first completed a questionnaire that 
assessed their NFCC (Webster and Kruglanski 1994; α = .78) and the same covariates from 
Study 1 (see Appendix G). After reading the same preview article from Study 1, with the same 
manipulation across groups, participants decided if they wanted to purchase access to the full 
article by redeeming one of the two vouchers or use both vouchers to purchase fun incentives.  
4.6.2. Results 
The descriptive results, as illustrated in Figure 26, panel a, show that 15.3% of participants in 
the interrupted condition bought the full article, compared with 31.1% in the concluded preview 
condition (χ2(1) = 4.24, p < .05). In a logistic regression, preview type, mean-centered NFCC, the 
preview type × NFCC interaction, and the same covariates served as the independent variables; it 
revealed a negative effect of the interrupted (vs. concluded) preview on purchase decisions (B = 
–1.99, SE = .80, z(120) = 2.48, p < .05). The significant interaction also indicated that this effect 
depended on the level of NFCC (B = –1.15, SE = .50, z(120) = 2.30, p < .05). According to a 
spotlight analysis, a negative effect arose for respondents with high NFCC (+1 SD) (B = –3.73, 
SE = 1.43, z(120) = 2.62, p < .01), but we found no effect for those with low NFCC (–1 SD) (B 
= –.25, SE = .63, z(120) = .40, n.s.), as illustrated in Figure 26, panel b.  
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a. Choice frequencies b. Logistic regression with NFCC as a modera-
tor 
 
 
 
Notes: The values in panel b are the estimated probabilities of purchasing the article, based on the logistic regression 
estimates. 
Figure 26: Paper 3 - Study 2: Effect of preview type on purchases 
4.6.3. Discussion 
The results of Study 2 thus confirm that, compared with a concluded preview, an interrupted 
preview leads to fewer purchases of the paid content, in initial support of hypothesis 2. Moreover, 
NFCC acts as a moderator of the influence of the preview type on purchases, such that the nega-
tive effect of interrupted previews on actual purchases is enhanced when NFCC increases, in 
support of hypothesis 3b.  
4.7. Study 3 
With Study 3, we seek to integrate the previous findings into an overall model of the detrimental 
effect of preview interruption on purchase that can depict the underlying process. It includes 
perceived betrayal, so that we can test for the postulated mediation.  
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4.7.1. Research method 
We used a between-subjects online experiment with one manipulated factor (preview type: con-
cluded vs. interrupted). The 125 undergraduate students (Mage = 21.0 years, SD = 3.22; 56.8% 
female) who completed the Study for extra class credit. These participants read the same short, 
relevant, text-based preview of a newspaper article as appeared in studies 1 and 2, and they 
learned that they would have to pay €0.50 to read the full article. The experimental conditions 
only differed in the preview endings (concluded vs. interrupted). Before the manipulation, we 
captured NFCC (decisiveness dimension) (Webster and Kruglanski 1994; α = .90) and the same 
covariates as in Study 1 and 2 (Appendix G). After the manipulation, participants indicated their 
perceived level of arousal (Mehrabian and Russel 1974; α = .88), feeling of betrayal (Grégoire 
and Fisher 2008; α = .78), and purchase intentions (Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990; α = .93).  
4.7.2. Results 
A regression analysis for arousal, with preview type, mean-centered NFCC, the preview type × 
NFCC interaction, and the covariates as independent variables, provided further support for hy-
pothesis 1. The interrupted preview again led to higher levels of arousal than the concluded pre-
view (B = .92, SE = .19, t(120) = 4.71, p < .01; Minterrupted = 2.98, SE = 1.34; Mconcluded = 2.05, SE 
= .93; t(123) = 4.52, p < .01), even as the covariate interest in the article topic exerted a signifi-
cant influence (B = .20, SE = .08, t(120) = 2.48, p < .05). The significant preview type × NFCC 
interaction revealed an enhancing effect too (B = .24, SE = .12, t(120) = 2.05, p < .05), such that 
an interrupted preview led to a stronger effect of arousal among high NFCC respondents (+1 SD; 
B = 1.34, SE = .28, t(120) = 4.72, p < .01) and had a weaker effect for respondents low in NFCC 
(–1 SD; B = .49, SE = .28, t(120) = 1.74, p < .10).  
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Another regression, for purchase intentions, showed a significant influence of preview type (B = 
–.69, SE = .20, t(121) = 3.52, p < .01). The significant preview type × NFCC interaction (B = –
.35, SE = .12, t(121) = 2.96, p < .01) affirmed that the negative effect of an interruption on pur-
chase intentions only occurred for respondents with high NFCC (+1 SD; B = –1.31, SE = .29, 
t(121) = 4.56, p < .01), not those low in NFCC (–1 SD; B = –.08, SE = .29, t(121) = .27, n.s.).  
To assess the mediating effects, we used the PROCESS SPSS macro (Hayes 2013) with 10,000 
bootstrap samples. The model included both arousal and betrayal as serial mediators, with pre-
view type and covariates as independent variables; it demonstrated the negative indirect effect of 
preview type through arousal and betrayal on purchase intentions. The 99% confidence interval 
(CI) around the estimate excluded 0 (B = –.06, SE = .03, CI: –.190 to –.010), in support of hy-
pothesis 2. We also uncovered effects of arousal on betrayal (B = .26, SE = .09, t(122) = 2.77, p 
< .01) and of betrayal on purchase intentions (B = –.27, SE = .08, t(122) = 3.26, p < .01), along 
with direct effects of preview type on betrayal (B = .68, SE = .23, t(122) = 2.97, p < .01) and of 
preview type on purchase intentions (B = –.40, SE = .22, t(122) = 1.83, p < .05), as displayed in 
Figure 27. 
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Notes: The covariates are interest in the article topic, frequency of reading online articles, technological anxiety, gender and age. 
We used a merging models option to combine the standard PROCESS models by Hayes (2013) and thereby integrated the mod-
erating effect of NFCC in the serial mediation model.  
*** p < .01, ** p < .05; the dashed line indicates a non-significant path. 
Figure 27: Paper 3 - Study 3: Indirect effect of preview type on purchase intention 
4.7.3. Discussion 
Testing a model that integrates the findings of studies 1 and 2, the results of Study 3 again show 
that an interrupted preview increases arousal (hypothesis 1), which leads to greater feelings of 
betrayal and, subsequently, lower purchase intentions (hypothesis 2). In line with hypothesis 3, 
our moderation analyses reveal that this effect is stronger for participants high in NFCC, whereas 
there are no significant differences for those low in NFCC.  
Overall then, our results are consistent across three studies, using three different methods. How-
ever, all three of these studies focus on paid content, which reflected our deliberate attempt to 
test whether an interrupted preview would lead to negative reactions if a closure hindrance pre-
vented consumers from satisfying their NFCC. To ensure that the findings are due to the exist-
ence of the closure hindrance, we thus need to test for these effects in a setting without any clo-
sure hindrance (i.e., free content).  
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Moreover, the article preview about the job market in Studies 1–3 addressed a relevant and func-
tional topic (O’Curry and Strahilevitz 2001). Consumer preferences and choices depend on the 
nature of the product benefit though, such that hedonic goods, which address consumers’ desire 
for fun and provide an affective experience (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982), may elicit stronger 
preferences than utilitarian products (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). To enhance the generaliza-
bility of our findings and rule out alternative explanations, we consider previews for free content 
(in addition to paid content) and hedonic (instead of utilitarian) content in Study 4. We accord-
ingly provide additional evidence for our theoretical explanation, according to which an inter-
rupted preview leads to negative emotions because the required payment prevents consumers 
from alleviating their increased arousal and satisfying their NFCC.  
4.8. Study 4 
4.8.1. Research method 
Study 4 is a 2 (preview type: concluded vs. interrupted) × 2 (closure hindrance: yes vs. no) be-
tween-subjects online experiment. A total of 132 undergraduate students (Mage = 20.65 years, SD 
= 2.83, 55.3% female) completed the Study for extra class credit. The manipulation was similar 
to those in studies 1–3, except that the excerpt previewed an article about a hedonic topic: a 
spring break celebration with a focus on students having fun (see Appendix H, (III) and (IV)). 
A pretest with 49 undergraduate students (Mage = 25.0 years, SD = 5.02; 72.5% female) con-
firmed that the preview of the job market article was perceived as more functional (Mjob market = 
4.31, SE = 1.08; Mspring break = 3.00, SE = 1.40, t(49) = 3.80, p < .01), whereas the spring break 
article preview appeared more entertaining (Mjob market = 3.14, SE = 1.49; Mspring break = 3.94, SE = 
1.47, t(49) = 1.91, p < .05) on 7-point Likert scales (Appendix G). 
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The main questionnaire captured respondents’ NFCC (decisiveness dimension) (Webster and 
Kruglanski 1994; α = .91) and the same covariates. After viewing the stimulus material, partici-
pants indicated their arousal (Mehrabian and Russel 1974; α = .94), purchase inten-
tions/intentions to read the entire article (for free content) (Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990; α 
= .93), and feelings of betrayal (Grégoire and Fisher 2008; α = .79). 
4.8.2. Results 
Preview articles for paid hedonic content. To compare the results with our previous studies, we 
first analyzed the two paid content conditions, in which a closure hindrance existed. The regres-
sion on arousal revealed an effect of preview type (B = .84, SE = .27, t(56) = 3.12, p < .01) and a 
significant preview type × NFCC interaction (B = .29, SD = .19, t(56) = 1.54, p < .10), such that 
the effect of preview type on arousal was only evident for respondents high in NFCC (+1 SD; B 
= 1.26, SE = .38, t(56) = 3.35, p < .01), not those low in NFCC (–1 SD; B = .42, SE = .39, t(56) 
= 1.07, n.s.). The regression on purchase intention in turn showed a marginally significant nega-
tive effect of preview type (B = –.26, SE = .17, t(56) = 1.55, p < .10) and a significant preview 
type × NFCC interaction (B = –.20, SE = .12, t(56) = 1.71, p < .05). The diminishing effect of 
the interrupted preview on purchase intentions only occurred among respondents with high 
NFCC (+1 SD; B = –.56, SE = .24, t(56) = 2.36, p < .05), not those low in NFCC (–1 SD; B 
= .03, SE = .24, t(56) = .13, n.s.).  
Finally, we analyzed the overall process model to test for indirect effects, using PROCESS with 
10,000 bootstrap samples. Serial mediation of the preview type effect through arousal and be-
trayal was evident (B = –.03, SE = .02, 95% CI: –.114 to –.003). As illustrated in Figure 28, 
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panel a, the direct effect of preview type on purchase intentions remained significant (B = –.38, 
SE = .16, t(56) = 2.41, p < .01). These results confirm the findings from studies 1–3. 
Preview articles for free content. Free content creates no closure hindrance, so we conducted a 
separate regression on arousal, with preview type, mean-centered NFCC, and the preview type × 
NFCC interaction as independent variables. In this case, an interrupted preview again led to 
greater arousal than a concluded one (B = .92, SE = .31, t(68) = 2.96, p < .01; Minterrupted = 2.69, 
SE = 1.52; Mconcluded = 1.81, SE = 1.23; t(70) = 2.71, p < .01). The significant preview type × 
NFCC interaction (B = .37, SE = .21, t(68) = 1.75, p < .05) further revealed that this effect oc-
curred only with high NFCC (+1 SD; B = 1.46, SE = .44, t(68) = 3.33, p < .01), not with low 
NFCC (–1 SD; B = .37, SE = .44, t(68) = .85, n.s.). These findings are consistent with the results 
for paid content. 
However, the free conditions revealed a distinct, positive effect of preview type on intentions to 
read the entire article (B = 1.21, SE = .38, t(68) = 3.19, p < .01) and a significant, positive pre-
view type × NFCC interaction (B = .46, SE = .26, t(68) = 1.77, p < .05). That is, unlike the paid 
content setting, an interrupted preview increased intentions to read the whole article among re-
spondents high in NFCC (+1 SD; B = 1.88, SE = .54, t(68) = 3.50, p < .01), with no effect for 
low NFCC respondents (–1 SD; B = .52, SE = .54, t(68) = .99, n.s.). As Figure 28, panel b, re-
veals, the mediation model indicates an indirect effect of preview type, through arousal, on pur-
chase intentions (B = .40, SE = .16, 99% CI: .061 to .948), but no indirect effect through arousal 
and betrayal (B = .02, SE = .06, 90% CI: –.033 to .171). We also uncover a direct positive effect 
of preview type on purchase intention (B = .55, SE = .34, t(65) = 1.59, p < .10), as well as effects 
of the covariates interest in the article topic (B = .27, SE = .11, t(65) = 2.40, p < .05), frequency 
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of reading online articles (B = .26, SE = .10, t(65) = 2.54, p < .05), and age (B = -.17, SE = .08, 
t(65) = 2.13, p < .05).  
a. Closure hindrance (paid content) 
 
b. No closure hindrance (free content) 
 
Notes: The covariates are interest in the article topic, frequency of reading online articles, technological anxiety, gender and age. 
We use the merging models option to combine the standard PROCESS models (Hayes 2013) and integrate the moderating effect 
of NFCC in the serial mediation model. 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. 
Figure 28: Paper 3 - Study 4: Conditional indirect effects of preview endings on purchase intention 
Comparison of paid and free content. With a combined, conditional process analysis of all four 
experimental conditions, using closure hindrance as an additional moderator, we found a moder-
ating effect on the relationship between arousal and betrayal (B = –.39, SE = .18, t(128) = 2.19, p 
< .05). That is, arousal led to betrayal in the paid condition (B = .27, SE = .15, t(55) = 1.82, p 
< .05), but not when the content was free (B = –.05, SE = .11, t(128) = .47, n.s.). The direct ef-
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fect of preview type on purchase intentions/intentions to read the whole article also was moder-
ated by closure hindrance (B = 1.42, SE = .46, t(127) = 3.11, p < .01), so that the effect was neg-
ative for paid content (B = –.26, SE = .17, t(56) = 1.55, p < .10) but positive for free content (B = 
1.21, SE = .38, t(68) = 3.19, p < .01). 
4.8.3. Discussion 
By testing the model with hedonic content, the results of Study 4 provide further support for 
hypotheses 1–3. We find that the effect of an interrupted preview on the level of arousal is inde-
pendent of the presence of a closure hindrance (paid vs. free content), but the effect on purchase 
intentions gets reversed for free content. In line with our predictions in hypothesis 2, this finding 
implies that a Zeigarnik effect (1938) occurs, regardless of the existence of an access barrier, but 
its consequences differ depending on whether the barrier exists. Consumers’ greater arousal 
leads to negative emotions (i.e., perceived betrayal) when they are hindered from satisfying their 
NFCC, which lowers their purchase intentions. When the content is free and there is no such 
barrier, no negative emotions arise, and consumers react with even higher intentions to read the 
full article. Thus, Study 4 rules out alternative explanations for the negative effect, by isolating 
closure hindrance as a main driver. The results also show a direct effect of level of arousal on 
purchase intentions, beyond its effect on betrayal, which was not present in Study 3. Therefore, 
higher levels of arousal appear to increase purchase intentions for paid hedonic content. Perhaps 
the entertaining article topic elicited stronger preferences than the utilitarian one (Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000). However, the overall effect on purchase intentions remains negative and 
significant for hedonic paid content, thus replicating and confirming our previous results. 
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4.9. General discussion 
For many content providers, previews offer the promise of capturing consumers’ attention, yet 
we know little about the effects of interrupted previews or the theoretical mechanisms that might 
predict consumers’ reactions to them. With this Study, we show that the Zeigarnik (1938) effect 
of interrupted activities, mainly investigated in the field of psychology, also has great relevance 
for consumer’s purchase decisions. Using preview interruptions of online content as our Study 
context, we provide the first evidence of the negative consumer behavioral consequences of the 
Zeigarnik effect. Specifically, our findings show that consumers react with greater arousal to an 
interrupted preview than to a concluded one (confirming hypothesis 1). This increased arousal 
does not lead to more purchases though, despite the conventional wisdom shared by many practi-
tioners. Instead, arousal leads to feelings of betrayal, which result in fewer purchases, as we pre-
dicted in hypothesis 2. Both the positive effect of an interruption on consumers’ arousal and its 
negative consequence for purchase behavior get enhanced with greater NFCC (confirming hy-
pothesis 3). Furthermore, we show that the negative effect of an interrupted preview is caused by 
the barrier of a required payment (hypothesis 2), because consumers’ responses switch direction 
in the case of free content access.  
The evidence from our four empirical studies, using a variety of methods and experimental de-
signs, contributes to existing literature by demonstrating clearly that the strategic exploitation of 
the Zeigarnik effect may bring along some negative consequences. This new perspective helps 
move studies of the Zeigarnik effect beyond the positive potential responses of consumers, such 
as higher recall (Baddeley 2008; Green 1963), higher attention (Hammadi and Qureishi 2013), 
greater persuasion effects, or a higher willingness to pay (Kardes et al. 2007). Furthermore, for 
NFCC literature, we reveal a new element that is characteristic of consumers with high NFCC. 
 115 
 
That is, previous research (for a review, see Webster and Kruglanski 2011) suggests that high 
NFCC implies more judgment confidence (Mayseless and Kruglanski 1987), a greater likelihood 
to seek information (Trope and Bassok 1983), stronger primacy and anchoring effects (Kruglan-
ski and Freund 1983), and stronger stereotypes (Jamieson and Zanna 1989). To the best of our 
knowledge though, this Study is the first to demonstrate consumers’ varying levels of behavioral 
resistance to closure hindrance, according to their NFCC. We reveal that consumers high in 
NFCC react more strongly when they cannot finish an activity, which leads to both more nega-
tive feelings (e.g., betrayal) and also lower purchase intentions for paid content but increased 
intentions to consume the whole article if it is offered for free. In this sense, our research extends 
existing literature (Kupor et al. 2015; Kupor and Tormala 2015) by focusing on individual NFCC 
as a moderator of the negative effects of interruptions.  
With these theoretical contributions, our Study sheds not only light on how consumers react to 
different teasing strategies for online content but also suggests some interesting managerial im-
plications. When companies use previews to attract potential consumers, they should consider 
the design carefully. Our investigation shows that a strategic interruption is detrimental in the 
context of text-based previews for paid content. Companies that currently interrupt their pre-
views in an effort to sell paid content might reconsider their design; they potentially are harming 
their own sales by evoking negative emotions. Instead, they might achieve better results by 
providing concluded previews. For companies that use text-based previews for free content 
though (e.g., google news, yahoo, yelp.com), interrupted previews are likely to be effective, in 
that they increase consumption of the entire text, which can increase website traffic and poten-
tially advertising-based revenues.  
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Certain limitations also need to be considered when interpreting the results. First, our investiga-
tion is limited to text-based online content, such as online articles or e-books. These findings 
should not be extended to more visual- or audio-based media without careful consideration, due 
to the unique ways that interruptions are manifested in these contexts. Second, some content 
providers promise access to similar products (online news articles) for free, if consumers will 
accept the display of advertising on the same screen, which is a business model outside of the 
scope of our investigation. Third, the feeling of betrayal that we identify when consumers must 
pay to access an article might decrease if the required payment is well accepted or anticipated by 
consumers (e.g., previews for e-books).  
For more general implications, continued research should expand our results to different indus-
tries (e.g., audio books, text-based advertising, click-baiting). Additional studies could focus on 
other variables that might emerge in these psychological processes (e.g., fairness perceptions, 
dissatisfaction) to provide deeper insights. Moreover, previous research indicates that other pre-
view characteristics (e.g., usefulness or quantity of provided content) and personal traits influ-
ence consumers’ buying decisions (e.g., Cheng and Tang 2010; Haruvy and Prasad 2001) and 
information processing (Choi et al. 2008). Further research thus might investigate different pre-
view lengths or various types of interruptions (e.g., at different points in the last sentence).  
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. General discussion and summary of the results 
Through the papers outlined in the preceding chapters, this dissertation shed light on three im-
portant factors; namely, understanding customers’ reactions to free-to-fee switches (Paper 1), 
minimizing the negative consequences of free-to-fee switches by choosing different switching 
options (Paper 2), as well as handling text-based preview characteristics after a free-to-fee switch 
(Paper 3). 
The results of Paper 1 showed that key differences exist between free-to-fee switches and con-
ventional price increases. Customers’ reactions are characterized by a stronger feeling of betrayal, 
anger, and lower purchase intentions compared to a conventional price increase. However, these 
negative consequences can be mitigated by providing a reason for the switch in forms of a justi-
fication or by adding extra value while introducing the new price. 
Paper 2 contributed to the understanding of reducing negative consequences of free-to-fee 
switches by considering the option of a freemium switch (which allows customers to continue 
use to a functional restricted product version for free) in addition to a forced switch (which de-
nies the possibility of using parts of the product for free after the switch). The results showed that 
using freemium is a double-edged sword; on the one hand, the possibility of giving customers a 
choice leads to better attitudes but, on the other hand, it reduces purchase intents. Additionally, 
the findings showed that companies should use an average functionality for the free-version in a 
freemium switch to obtain the desired positive effects on attitudes. Moreover, companies should 
work with a justification for both switching types.  
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Importantly, when companies make a decision to switch to a freemium business model, different 
preview characteristics have to be considered. Paper 3 demonstrated that companies (e.g., online 
newspaper providers) should choose their text-based preview endings carefully after a free-to-fee 
switch. The results revealed that providing an interrupted preview ending for charged content 
causes emotional arousal that cannot be immediately resolved because of the required payment. 
This unresolved arousal leads to greater feelings of betrayal and results in lower purchases com-
pared to a concluded preview ending. Conversely, the intention to read the entire article is great-
er after an interruption – but only when the article is for free.  
To summarize, the first paper provides evidence for the negative effects of free-to-fee switches, 
which can be minimized by justifying the switch. Paper 2 extends this knowledge by considering 
the possibility of a freemium switch. However, the improvement in attitudes caused by providing 
an additional free version is accompanied by a decrease in purchase intents. Paper 3 focuses on 
preview characteristics in freemium business models and illustrates that an interrupted preview 
ending (vs. a concluded one) is inferior for commercial text-based content. Figure 29 provides 
an overview of the main results of the dissertation.  
Figure 29: Overview of the main results 
Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3
“The Mechanisms of 
Free-to-Fee Switches –
A Special Form of a 
Price Increase?”
“Free no More -
The Effects of Choice Options in 
Unexpected Free-to-Fee 
Switches”
“To Be Continued… The Effects 
of Interrupted Preview Endings 
on Purchase Decisions”
Main Result: A free-to-fee 
switch (vs. a conventional 
price increase) leads to lower 
attitudes and lower purchase 
intents.
Main Result: A freemium free-to-
fee switch (vs. a forced switch) 
leads to a lower decrease in 
attitudes but also to a higher 
decrease in purchase intents.
Main Result: An interrupted 
preview ending (vs. a concluded 
ending) leads to higher feelings 
of betrayal and lower purchase 
intents for paid content.
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5.2. Managerial implications 
The different examples of online newspaper websites (e.g., New York Times), banks (e.g., Bank 
of America), software developers (e.g., WhatsApp Inc.), educational programs (e.g., museums), 
as well as supermarkets (e.g., introduction of fees for plastic bags in the UK) show that the 
switch from free to fee is becoming increasingly more common. However, companies’ efforts to 
introduce prices for products or services that were previously free of charge are quite unsystem-
atic; meanwhile, customers’ acceptance of free-to-fee switches remains low (Reid 2002a, 2002b). 
Even free-to-fee switches of larger companies, such as the New York Times or Bank of America, 
are characterized by trial and error approaches (Ingram 2015; Mui 2011): an indication of how 
wide-ranging these haphazard methods are.   
This dissertation thus reveals the importance of practical implications for companies planning a 
free-to-fee switch or having experienced a switch in the past. First, companies should be very 
careful with unexpected price introductions as they can lead to feelings of betrayal, lower atti-
tudes toward the company, and can cause long-term damage to existing customer relationships. 
Price introductions should, subsequently, not be treated like normal price increases. Instead, 
companies should put more planning efforts in an appropriate switching strategy before introduc-
ing a new price. Second, a suitable way to minimize these negative consequences is to supply 
customers with a reason for the switch by using a strong and compelling justification. Another 
way to justify the switch is to add extra value to the product (e.g., new features, better quality, 
etc.) when introducing the new price. Third, companies have two main switching options: either 
a forced switch (without the additional offer of a free version) or a freemium switch, which addi-
tionally provides a free reduced version. A forced switch is recommended when companies are 
primarily interested in short-term sales as freemium causes cannibalization effects of the fee-
 120 
 
based product version. However, from a customer-relationship point of view, a freemium switch 
is recommended as it reduces detrimental attitudes toward the company. In addition, when com-
panies choose a freemium business model they should consider the feature reduction of the free 
version carefully. As low and high feature reduction of the free version causes negative effects 
on purchase intentions of the commercial product, a medium level of feature reduction for the 
free version is therefore recommended. Fourth, preview characteristics are an important aspect 
for making freemium work. This can be shown in the context of text-based previews for online 
newspaper articles. An interrupted preview ending is only recommended for free content; other-
wise, companies should choose a concluded ending to increase purchase intents.  
Since companies in different areas are affected by free-to-fee switches and freemium business 
models, these research findings are of practical interest for a wide range of companies (e.g., 
software and app developers, banks, newspaper providers, etc.). In particular, companies con-
fronted with free-to-fee switches in highly competitive markets (e.g., companies selling software 
or online content) can particularly benefit from the findings of this dissertation. 
5.3. Theoretical implications and contribution to existing literature 
From a theoretical point of view, this investigation addresses important gaps in the literature and 
opens new research avenues. First, it contributes to pricing literature; this is an area of study 
where only a few articles about free-to-fee switches exist (see Chapter 1.6, literature review). 
While most of the academic literature is focused on price increases and customers’ fairness per-
ception (e.g., Bolton et al. 2003, Xia et al. 2004), only a few publications have investigated the 
phenomenon of switching a business model from free to fee by introducing a price for a product 
or service that was previously free (Pauwels and Weiss 2008; Tuzovic et al. 2014). This disserta-
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tion is, therefore, the first empirical work that shows that the theoretical mechanisms of free-to-
fee switches are different compared to conventional price increases. Price introductions subse-
quently demand a different theoretical framework. By revealing the psychological mechanisms 
in the first paper, the author makes a fundamental contribution to explain these differences. Ad-
ditionally, the author also shows boundary conditions by adding different moderators (justifica-
tion and extra value). Consequently, this investigation also makes a contribution to literature 
about price effects of free products (zero price effect) (e.g., Baumbach 2016; Hossain and Saini 
2015) by showing that different expectations of free products can lead to negative customers’ 
reactions after a price introduction.  
This study also supplements current research about justifications within the pricing literature 
(Schein 2002; Martin et al. 2009), by showing a stronger positive moderating influence of justifi-
cations on negative consequences after a price introduction compared to a price increase.  
The second paper sheds light on choice situations in free-to-fee switches and has theoretical im-
plications for freemium research. Providing a free product version leads to positive emotions but 
also causes negative cannibalization effects on the commercial product. The predominance of the 
positive effect (caused by emotions) or the negative effect (due to cannibalization) depends on 
the level of feature reduction of the free-version. While the investigation of Cheng and Tang 
(2010) illustrates the negative effect of low feature reduction of the free version on the commer-
cial product, this dissertation is the first to show that a strong feature reduction can also lead to 
negative consequences.  
Finally, the third paper contributes to research about the Zeigarnik-effect of interrupted activities 
(Zeigarnik 1938). This examination shows that interrupted preview articles follow the same 
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mechanisms as other interrupted activities (Worchel and Arnold 1974), leading to a higher level 
of arousal. In this regard, the author expanded upon prior research findings by indicating that 
arousal only leads to negative effects when consumers are not able to resolve it (for instance, 
because of a required payment). However, in the case of free content – without a payment – this 
arousal can result in positive outcomes. Moreover, the author also adds to the body of literature 
about individual need for cognitive closure (Webster and Kruglanski 1994) by including it as a 
boundary condition. 
5.4. Limitations and future research 
Certain limitations should be considered for this research. The investigations of Paper 1 and Pa-
per 2 were conducted within the context of mobile apps. To generalize and validate the findings, 
a replication of the study in other areas and with different types of products or services is rec-
ommended (e.g., introducing a new fee for withdrawing money at an ATM, etc.). It could also be 
useful to replicate some of the investigations in other cultures (e.g., China or Latin America) 
because other cultures are more or less familiar with free-to-fee switches and have different price 
perceptions (Meng 2011).  
Aside from these limitations, the research findings generate a broad array of future research pos-
sibilities. Further investigations can focus on providing different kinds of extra values (e.g., 
product related, an additional service, etc.) and a variety of justifications (e.g., profit-orientated 
vs. cost-orientated). Additionally, future research should consider different characteristics of 
freemium business models. While the author provides possible theoretical explanations with 
mediation models, alternative explanations and different mediators (e.g., justice, price-quality 
relationship, etc.) should be tested. Another way to extend the provided model could be the in-
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vestigation of additional moderators (e.g., customers’ expectation of a free-to-fee switch, credi-
bility of the company, etc.).  
Furthermore, Paper 3 could be extended to include previews for visual (e.g., movies) and audio 
content (e.g., audio books) in addition to text-based previews to generalize the findings and 
strengthen the theoretical explanation.  
While this dissertation covers free-to-fee switches in a business-to-consumer context (B2C) the 
investigation of free-to-fee switches in business-to-business areas (B2B), including after-sales 
services, could be of interest for companies as well (Reinartz and Ulaga 2008). Likewise, re-
search about switching back from fee-to-free (such as in the case of New York Times) could also 
be an interesting area for future research. 
5.5. Outlook 
Companies selling digital content have to survive in an increasing competitive environment (e.g., 
the media and entertainment industry). Their business strategy sometimes requires a free product 
at the beginning and a price introduction after a certain user base is established. In other cases, 
companies are forced to introduce a price after a period of time because of external restrictions 
(see Chapter 1.3). While the motivations behind free-to-fee switches are diverse, more and more 
companies have to deal with the obstacles of introducing a price for a product or service that had 
initially been provided for free. Indeed, some of these companies have also experienced negative 
consequences after an unsystematic price introduction (e.g., Bank of America). Considering its 
practical relevance, it becomes increasingly vital for practitioners and researchers alike to further 
investigate the phenomenon of free-to-fee switches. This dissertation provides fundamental in-
sights into handling the switch while reducing negative consequences. In doing so, however, it 
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also opens a wide range of future research avenues that need to be explored to understand and 
implement unexpected price introductions.  
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III. Appendix 
Appendix A 
 
Informant demographic characteristics (Study 1 – in depth-interviews) 
 
Name 
 
Gender Age Occupation 
Relationship 
status 
Annual income 
(€) 
Katharina Female 27 Employed Single < 20.000 
Tilda Female 23 Student Single < 20.000 
Jasmin Female 23 Employed Single < 20.000 
Andreas Male 35 Employed Married 20.000 – 50.000 
Laura Female 30 Employed Single 20.000 – 50.000 
Paul Male 20 Employed Single < 20.000 
Lisa Female 22 Employed Single 20.000 – 50.000 
Tom Male 25 Employed Single < 20.000 
Paulo Male 24 Employed Single < 20.000 
Agnes Female 22 Student  Single < 20.000 
Nadine Female 21 Student Single < 20.000 
Eva Female 66 Retiree Widowed 50.000 – 80.000 
Martin Male 23 Student Single < 20.000 
Lars Male 24 Employed Single < 20.000 
Dirk Male 26 Employed Married < 20.000 
Anette Female 25 Employed Single 20.000 – 50.000 
Werner Male 66 Retiree Married 50.000 – 80.000 
Amelie Female 63 Employed Married 50.000 – 80.000 
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Appendix B 
 
Stimuli used in studies 2 for extra value 
I: No extra value of the product 
 
 
II: Extra value of the product 
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Appendix C 
 
Items and reliability measures (Study 1 time 1 / Study 1 time 2/ Study 2/ Study 3/ Study 4) 
  
Cronbach’s  
alpha 
Composite reliability 
(AVE) 
Factor  
loadings 
Indicator  
reliability 
Fairness perceptions
a
 
(Kukar-Kinney et al. 2007) 
.79/.77/.91/.79/.96/.95 .56/.53/.72/.55/.86/.85   
The way in which the company introduced the 
fee was
d
: 
    
 1. a fair way .82/.74/.89/.79/.97/.90 .45/.54/.79/.63/.94/.81 
 2. a satisfactory way .62/.60/.84/.66/.95/.97 .60/.35/.71/.43/.91/.94 
 3. an acceptable way .86/.83/.89/.77/.90/.90 .70/.68/.81/.60/.81/.81 
Attitude toward the company
b
  
(Goldsmith et al. 2001) 
.82/.78/.95/.89/.98/.97 .61/.55/.87/.74/.94/.93   
My overall impression of the company is:     
 1. bad – good .88/.89/.95/.88/.97/.95 .77/.79/.89/.78/.93/.89 
 2. unfavorable – favorable .54/.55/.90/.82/.96/.97 .30/.31/.80/.68/.93/.94 
 3. negative – positive .87/.75/.95/.87/.98/.97 .75/.56/.91/.75/.95/.95 
Purchase/Usage intention
b
  
(Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990) 
.96/.94/.95/.92/.93/.94 .88/.85/.87/.80/.81/.83   
 1. unlikely - likely .99/.97/.94/.95/.91/.91 .99/.95/.89/.90/.84/.83 
 2. improbable - probable .95/.96/.98/.96/.93/.99 .89/.91/.95/.92/.87/.99 
 3. impossible - possible .87/.83/.87/.75/.85/.82 .75/.69/.76/.57/.72/.68 
App use
a c
 
(Mathwick and Rigdon 2004)                            
  .92/  -  /.92/.91/.90/.90       .80/  -  /.75/.72/.70/.69   
 1 I spend several hours a week with my apps. .90/  -  /.78/.77/.72/.77 .82/  -  /.60/.59/.52/.59 
 2 Compared with most people, I think I spend a lot of time with my apps. .99/  -  /.90/.85/.89/.86 .99/  -  /.81/.72/.79/.74 
 3 I consider myself to be a “heavy user” of apps. .77/  -  /.88/.94/.94/.88 .59/  -  /.78/.88/.89/.78 
Technological anxiety
a
  
(Barbeite and Weiss 2004) 
.93/  -  /.95/.92/.96/.95  .78/  -  /.83/.75/.86/.81 
  
 1 Working with a mobile service would make me very nervous. .91/  -  /.91/.77/.98/.93 .83/  -  /.83/.60/.96/.87 
 2. I get a sinking feeling when I think of trying to use mobile services. .89/  -  /.93/.88/.82/.90 .80/  -  /.87/.78/.68/.81 
 3. Using mobile services makes me feel uncomfortable. .88/  -  /.94/.95/.94/.82 .78/  -  /.89/.90/.88/.68 
 4. Using mobile services makes me feel uneasy and confused. .83/  -  /.86/.84/.95/.95 .69/  -  /.75/.71/.91/.90 
Utilitarian product
b
 (Single Item; I believe the product is necessary (O’Curry and Strahilevitz 2001) (Only used in Study 2). 
Hedonic product
b
 (Single Item; I believe the product is entertaining (O’Curry and Strahilevitz 2001) (Only used in Study 2) 
Perceived usefulness
b
 (Single Item; I believe the product is useful (Cox and Cox 2002) (Only used in Study 2) 
CFA model fit Study 1a: (t1): ² (125) = 265.85; ²/df = 2.13; RMSEA = .132; SRMR = .088; CFI = .86; NNFI = .83 
CFA model fit Study 1a: (t2): ² (32) = 64.42; ²/df = 2.01; RMSEA = .125; SRMR = .083; CFI = .91; NNFI = .87 
CFA model fit Study 2: ² (123) = 184.76; ²/df = 1.50; RMSEA = .052; SRMR = .039; CFI = .98; NNFI = .97 
CFA model fit Study 3: ² (123) = 266.79; ²/df = 2.17; RMSEA = .054; SRMR = .034; CFI = .97; NNFI = .96 
CFA model fit Study 4: ² (123) = 162.15; ²/df = 1.32; RMSEA = .042; SRMR = .036; CFI = .99; NNFI = .98 
Note: 
a 
measured on seven-point scales (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree); 
b
measured on a seven-point semantic differential (-3, +3); Items with factor 
loading under .70 where excluded, except for latent constructs with 3 or less items (Bagozzi and Yi 1988).  
c
 adapted from their original scale: internet usage 
d
 a different wording was used for Study 1 (“The way the company offered the product was: 1. a fair way, 2. 
an unfair way, 3. a satisfactory way, 4. an acceptable way”) to be able to compare point in time 1 (where no fee was introduced yet) to point in time 2 
(introduction of the fee). 
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Appendix D 
 
Construct correlations (Study 1 time 1 / Study 1 time 2/ Study 2/ Study 3/ Study 4) 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1.  Fairness Per-
ceptions 
    
2.  Attitude toward 
the company 
.04/.39/.75/.52/.79    
3.  Purchase/usage 
intention 
−.05/.04/.43/.05/−.08 .77/.20/.60/.13/−.10   
4.  App use −.05/  -  /.18/−.01/.13 .18/  -  /.31/.02/.01 .18/  -  /.29/.16/.11 
 
 
5.  Technological 
anxiety 
−.13/  -  /.01/−.01/.08 −.26/  -  /−.14/−.06/.15 −.18/  -  /−.22/.09/.02 −.56/ - /−.50/−.18/−.31 
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Appendix E 
 
Stimuli used in studies 1-4 
I: Study 1: Description of the app before the free-to-fee switch (t1) 
 
II: Study 1: Simulated usage (t1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XIII 
 
III: Study 1: Announcement of the free-to-fee switch (t2) and reduced version 
 Forced switch  
  announcement 
 
 
Freemium switch announce-
ment 
 
 
Free reduced version in the 
freemium switch  
condition  
 
 
IV: Studies 2 and 3: Description of the app before the free-to-fee switch 
 
 XIV 
 
V: Studies 2 and 3: Simulated usage 
 
 
 
 
VI: Studies 2 and 3: Announcement of the free-to-fee switch 
Forced switch  
announcement 
 
Freemium switch  
announcement 
 
 
 
 
 
 XV 
 
VII: Study 3: Description of the free version in the freemium switch condition 
Low feature 
reduction (also Study 2) 
 
 Medium feature      
reduction 
 
High feature           
reduction 
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Appendix F 
 
Examples of concluded and interrupted previews 
The Wall Street Journal 
Concluded Interrupted 
 
(Source: www.wsj.com; April 11, 2017) 
 
(Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-delays-toshiba-files-earnings-without-
auditors-approval-1491901443; April 11, 2017) 
Chicago Tribune 
Concluded Interrupted 
 
(Source: www.chicagotribune.com; April 11, 2017) 
 
(Source: www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/; April 11, 2017) 
Financial Times 
Concluded 
 
 
(Source: www.ft.com/companies; April 11, 2017) 
  
 XVII 
 
Appendix G 
 
Items and reliability measures (Studies 1/2/3/4) 
  Cronbach’s Alpha 
Arousal
a 
(Mehrabian and Russel 1974)  - / - /.88/.94 
 1. nervous 
 2. excited 
 3. tense 
 4. jittery 
Perceived Betrayal
a
 (Grégoire and Fisher 2008)  - / - /.78/.79 
 1. I felt cheated by the provider. 
 2. I felt betrayed by the provider. 
 3. I felt lied to by the provider. 
 4. The provider intended to take advantage of me. 
Purchase Intention/Intention to Read the Article
b
 (Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990)  - / - /.93/.93 
Please rate the probability that you would buy the full newspaper article: 
 1. unlikely–likely 
 2. improbable–probable 
 3. impossible–possible 
Need for Closure (Decisiveness)
b
 (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994) .77/.78/.90/.91 
 1. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved. 
 2. When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly 
 3. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem immediately. 
Technological Anxiety
a
 (Barbeite and Weiss 2004) .88/.93/.96/.96 
 1. Working with the internet would make me very nervous. 
 2. I get a sinking feeling when I think of trying to use the internet. 
 3. Using the internet makes me feel uncomfortable. 
 4. Using the internet make me feel uneasy and confused. 
Interest in the Topic of the Article
a 
(Mathwick and Rigdon 2004) .84/.63/.86/.86 
 1. dull (r) 
 2. fascinating 
 3. uninteresting (r) 
 4. attentive 
Frequency of Reading Online Articles
b
  
How often do you read online articles? 
Information Quantity
 b
 (pretest Study 1)  
Please rate the quantity of the provided information in the review (low vs. high). 
Article Quality
 b
 (pretest Study 1)  
Please rate the quality of the preview (low vs. high).  
Utilitarian Product
a
 (pretest and Study 4; O’Curry and Strahilevitz 2001)  
I believe the article topic is necessary.  
Hedonic Product
a
 (pretest and Study 4; O’Curry and Strahilevitz 2001)  
I believe the article topic is entertaining. 
a Measured on seven-point scales (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree).b Measured on a seven-point semantic differential (-3, 
+3).  
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Appendix H 
 
Preview articles used as stimuli in studies 1–4 
I. Studies 1–3: concluded preview ending (utilitarian article) 
 
Translation 
Start the future safe with a business degree: New salary predictions for students majoring in business and 
economics 
A recent study carried out by the University Alliance Ruhr shows that the numbers of graduates in North 
Rhine-Westphalia continues to increase. Many students are afraid that the greater supply in the job market 
might have negative effects on their future salary. The Technical University of Dortmund, the Ruhr-
University Bochum, and the University Duisburg-Essen have conducted a research study regarding this 
concern and came to the conclusion that the salaries in several areas will likely increase even more. 
II. Studies 1–3: interrupted preview ending (utilitarian article) 
 
Translation 
Start the future safe with a business degree: New salary predictions for students majoring in business and 
economics 
A recent study carried out by the University Alliance Ruhr shows that the numbers of graduates in North 
Rhine-Westphalia continues to increase. Many students are afraid that the greater supply in the job market 
might have negative effects on their future salary. The Technical University of Dortmund, the Ruhr-
University Bochum, and the University Duisburg-Essen have conducted a research study regarding this 
concern and came to the conclusion that the salaries in several areas will likely increase even more. In 
addition, it has been shown that … 
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III. Study 4: concluded preview ending (hedonic article) 
 
Translation 
Spring break instead of the lecture hall: Five business students are testing the best spring break parties. 
Literally, “Spring Break” means nothing more than a vacation in the spring. But what sounds so innocent is actually 
a party without any limits. Uncontrolled student parties started in the United States and became legendary because 
of their crazy drinking games, endless flow of alcohol, and lots of nudity. But when it comes to partying, the 
Europeans are not far behind the Americans, and so we sent five students to join the Mega Party “Spring Break 
Europe” in Croatia. The party marathon in Croatia included sexy competitions, like voting for “Miss Wet T-Shirt” 
and “Mr. Bootylicious,” which are not to be missed.  
IV. Study 4: interrupted preview ending (hedonic article) 
 
Translation 
Spring break instead of the lecture hall: Five business students are testing the best spring break parties. 
Literally, “Spring Break” means nothing more than a vacation in the spring. But what sounds so innocent is actually 
a party without any limits. Uncontrolled student parties started in the United States and became legendary because 
of their crazy drinking games, endless flow of alcohol, and lots of nudity. But when it comes to partying, the 
Europeans are not far behind the Americans, and so we sent five students to join the Mega Party “Spring Break 
Europe” in Croatia. The party marathon in Croatia included sexy competitions, like voting for “Miss Wet T-Shirt” 
and “Mr. Bootylicious,” which are not to be missed. It quickly became clear that … 
 
